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1 
Introduction 
 “Women can stay at home and afford two square meals by working…it is the first time in 
my married life that I have saved some money in a bank and can plan for the education of my 
son.”1 This is Manju Parihar, an Indian woman in her thirties who is discussing the personal 
impact the country’s National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) has had on her and 
other women in her community. Because of the program, Manju has been able to find work 
locally, provide meals for her family, and gain financial independence. At the time of this quote, 
Manju had been working on a road construction site in her rural village with almost thirty other 
women.   
 As of 2011, just over one billion people in the world lived on less than $1.25 a day.2 The 
world has also witnessed a distinct feminization of poverty as women make up a large majority 
of this population.3 Some countries have looked to pro-growth and expansion strategies in order 
to help alleviate poverty. These policies, however, tend to be more beneficial to leading sectors, 
which are often high-tech and high-income industries. The aim of growth policies is that an 
increase in the income of these leading sectors will cause an increase in the demand for goods 
and services in lower-skilled sectors, thus raising the wages of low-skilled workers. However, 
research has shown that top down policies are often not a direct enough approach to poverty 
mitigation.4 Other welfare policies such as cash transfers and food stamps have also been 
implemented with poverty reduction in mind, but these programs can sometimes lead the poor to 
idle and lose marketable skills. Therefore, many progressive and post-Keynesian economists 
                                                
1 “NREGA changes lives of rural women in Rajasthan.” Deccan Herald. March 31. 2010. 
2 “Poverty Overview.” The World Bank. http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/overview#1. 
3 “Women in Poverty.” United Nations Women Watch. 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/directory/women_and_poverty_3001.htm. 
4 Hyman P. Minsky. “Effects of Shifts of Aggregate Demand upon Income Distribution.” Washington, 
D.C. 1967. 335. 
  
2 
have developed and become proponents of a different type of poverty solution: Employment 
Guarantee Programs (EGP). 
 An EGP is a social safety net in which the government works as the employer of last 
resort (ELR), employing all those ready, willing, and able to work in the public sector at a base 
wage. Such a program is a bottom-up policy and directly guarantees an income for those most in 
need. EGPs can not only affect the poor directly but they also provide a much more cost-
effective alternative to pro-growth policies. EGPs can be more efficient than other poverty 
alleviation programs because expenditure is directly connected to income. Expansion policies, in 
contrast, attempt to increase aggregate demand to a level conducive to full employment, making 
expenditure much harder to determine. Additionally, because women do make up the majority of 
those living in poverty, creating an EGP with a gendered perspective is imperative. This includes 
making sure women face no barriers to entry into the program, receive equal pay, are given 
supervisory and monitoring opportunities, and the time allocated to unpaid work is reduced.  
 Many developing nations from Argentina to South Africa have taken on different 
versions of an EGP in recent years. However, the world’s largest EGP to be implemented has 
been India’s NREGA, which came into action in 2006. The program guarantees 100 days of 
wage work to every rural household in participating states. Since its implementation, the 
program has had numerous macroeconomic, environmental, and social impacts. During the 
program’s policy formulation, the NREGA was enacted with several gendered dimensions 
including an explicit participation quota, opportunities for supervisory roles, and a provision of 
equal wages. This has led to numerous positive impacts for female workers, who have taken on a 
larger share of participation in the program in recent years. Some of these effects include 
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increased wages and a reduction of the wage gap, empowerment within their households and 
communities, and improvement in the health and education of their children.  
 However, the NREGA has faced a number of obstacles since is formulation. 
Implementation of the program has been less than perfect as states have failed to provide 
employment, wages have been delayed and withheld, and corruption has plagued the scheme due 
to a lack of proper social auditing and monitoring. Further, a recent government regime change 
has augmented this systemic erosion of the program, as proposals to scale back the NREGA have 
been discussed. Although the scheme has endured these setbacks, it has continued to have wide 
ranging positive effects in India, so much so that top Indian economists have penned letters to 
the government urging them to not scale back the program and thousands of rural workers have 
protested the government’s proposal to slash the scheme.  
 Because women have taken up a larger share in the participation of the NREGA and have 
seemed to benefit much more from the program than their male counterparts, this begs the 
question of how the systemic erosion of the program may impact women. This project aims at 
answering this question: How will the scaling back of the NREGA affect female workers? In 
order to answer this question, the project has been laid out as such: Chapter 1 deals with the 
literature on EGPs, how these types of programs have been implemented around the world, and 
the importance of maintaining a gendered perspective. Chapter 2 focuses on the NREGA, its 
overall impact on the Indian economy and workforce, and how it has been able to positively 
affect female workers. Chapter 3 then dives into the erosion of the program from its faulty 
implementation and the waning support from the Central Government. Finally, Chapter 4 
provides a counterfactual analysis on how the scaling back will possibly affect women. By 
closely considering the impact the NREGA has made on female workers, this analysis aims to 
  
4 
show a well-thought out and educated hypothesis on how the progress being made for women 
may be halted due to the systemic erosion of the scheme. First, the theoretical framework for 
EGPs and the importance of a gendered implementation will be discussed. 
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Chapter 1: Theoretical Framework and Literature Review 
1.1 Theoretical Background of Employment Guarantee Programs 
 The idea of the government working as an ELR has been seen in economic writings since 
as early as the seventeenth century.5 However, it was not until after the Industrial Revolution, 
most notably during the Great Depression, when it became clear that capitalist economies lack 
mechanisms for creating full employment on an ongoing and sustained basis.6 One of the first 
economists to point out these failures in modern monetary economies and the need for 
government intervention was economist John Maynard Keynes. At the heart of the theory behind 
EGPs and the ELR is the Keynesian idea that unemployment is a monetary phenomenon and 
capitalist economies consistently fail at providing long-term full employment. In his writings, 
Keynes had proposed an unemployment rate of 1 percent and stated that the government should 
do whatever possible to reach this level.7 
 Hyman Minsky is one of the most notable economists to support the idea of the 
government acting as an ELR.  Many of the anti-poverty policies implemented in the post-war 
period, namely the policies under the “War on Poverty,” were aimed at spurring growth and 
expansion. However, Minsky asserts that in our complex economy, growth has contrasting 
effects on different sectors. Often, when economic growth causes expansion in the leading 
sectors, demand and output may rise, increasing inflation while still maintaining high 
                                                
5 Fadhel Kaboub. “Employment Guarantee Programs: A Survey of Theories and Policy Experiences.” 
Annandale-on-Hudson. NY: The Levy Economics Institute. May 2007. 2. 
6 Fadhel Kaboub. “Employment Guarantee Programs: A Survey of Theories and Policy Experiences.” 2. 
7 Pavlina Tcherneva. “Employer of Last Resort.” J.E. King (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Post 
Keynesian Economics. Northampton. MA: Edward Elgar. 2012. 1. 
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unemployment levels. In contrast, when employment rises in the lagging sectors that operate 
below capacity, it has the potential to do so without causing inflation.8  
 When expansion occurs in the higher skilled or leading industries, the aim of pro-growth 
policies is that this success will eventually “trickle down” to the lower skilled sectors by creating 
jobs for the poor.9 However, evidence increasingly shows that economic expansions tend to 
favor the “haves over the have-nots.” The expansion of the 1960’s depicts this idea. In his paper 
on the effects of aggregate demand shifts on income distribution, Minsky examines twenty-five 
sectors between the years 1948 and 1966 to determine the effect of the expansion of the 1960’s 
on income distribution. He found that of the ten industries with the highest weekly earnings in 
1948, seven had increased their relative earnings by 1966 and for the eight industries with the 
lowest wages in 1948, seven experienced a substantial decline in the relative wages by 1966. In 
effect, between 1948-1966, the rich tended to get richer and the poor tended to get poorer.10 
Therefore, Minsky does not support the idea that economic growth should be a policy goal in 
itself but rather a possible result of other policies. 
 The expansion discussed above was due to high increases of investment in the private 
sector. A popular theory in the post-WII era was that in order to give the poor a better stance in 
the economy, there must be an increase in total income. One way this can be done is by 
stimulating private sector spending, or investment-led growth. Minsky cites four problems with 
this strategy: 
 First, tax incentives to shift income to capital exacerbate distributional inequality. 
 Second, high capital incomes would lead to opulent consumption by the rich and 
 emulative consumption by the less affluent, creating the potential for demand-pull 
                                                
8 Randall L. Wray. “Minsky's Approach to Employment Policy and Poverty: Employer of Last Resort and 
the War on Poverty.” Annandale-on-Hudson. NY: The Levy Economics Institute. 2007. 3. 
9 Stephanie A. Bell and L. Randall Wray. “The ‘War on Poverty’ after 40 Years: A Minskyan 
Assessment.” The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College. No. 78. 2004.18. 
10 Hyman P. Minsky. “Effects of Shifts of Aggregate Demand upon Income Distribution.” 335.  
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 inflation. Third, contracts granted to sophisticated, high-tech industries generate 
 demand for skilled, high wage labor, thereby exacerbating income inequality within the 
 labor force. Finally, by targeting the size and surety of capital income, business 
 confidence would mount, debt financing would increase and margins of safety would 
 decline.11 
 
A principal theory of Minsky’s is that stability often causes instability. Too much dependence on 
investment-led growth can lead to an investment boom, which increases indebtedness and 
perpetuates the fragility of the financial system. Minsky calls, rather, for expansion led by the 
public sector. This would provide much more stability, as safer assets (such as government 
bonds) would be available.12 
 Minsky asserts that the most important element of ending poverty is to focus on 
achieving tight full employment, which he notes as an unemployment level of 2.5 percent. He 
writes, “Tight full employment exists when over a broad cross-section of occupations, industries, 
and locations, employers, at going wages and salaries, would prefer to employ more workers 
than they in fact do.”13 Economist William Vickery also stated that full employment should be a 
top priority of policy makers. Vickery had a strong commitment to full employment, which he 
called “chock –full employment,” and described it as a situation where individuals seeking 
employment can find work at a livable wage within 48 hours. Vickery also embraced William 
Beveridge’s definition of full employment, which was depicted as a time where there are at least 
as many unfilled job openings as there are those who are unemployed and seeking work.14  
 Investment-led growth policies have shown time and again that they fail to meet such 
levels of full employment. The idea of the “rising tide to raise all boats” has not proven to be a 
                                                
11 Stephanie A. Bell and L. Randall Wray. “The ‘War on Poverty’ after 40 Years: A Minskyan 
Assessment.” 15.  
12 Ibid. 16.  
13 Hyman P. Minsky. “The Role of Employment Policy.” Levy Economics Institute Digital Commons. 
(1965). 3-4. 
14 Matthew Forstater. Saving-Recycling Public Employment: An Assets-Based Approach To Full 
Employment and Price Stability. The Jerome Levy Economics Institute. July 1999. 1. 
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direct enough approach for creating jobs and pulling people out of poverty. In order to achieve 
these desired rates of employment, Minsky and other Post-Keynesian economists have proposed 
the policy of the ELR that, unlike most modern poverty alleviation programs, directly creates a 
job guarantee at a base minimum wage to those most vulnerable to unemployment, regardless of 
profit expectations. Instead of stimulating GDP to a level that we hope will result in a desirable, 
yet indirect employment effect, we must formulate policy that directly guarantees job 
opportunities to all those who are willing and able.  
 
1.2 General Benefits and Design of Job Guarantee Programs  
Modern proposals of such a program include the following characteristics: 
 An ELR program would provide an infinitely elastic demand for employment. Regardless 
of what phase the business cycle is in, an EGP would offer jobs to all those who wish to work. 
Because the government does not have to worry about profitability, they can hire anyone 
regardless of race, gender, work experience, or education.15 Many modern day poverty 
alleviation proposals attempt to alter the characteristics of the poor through work training 
programs. However, Minsky and other economists have noted that this ignores fixing the 
institutions that have caused such unemployment. Therefore, the jobs created under an EGP 
would be tailored to the remaining workforce, providing a more straightforward approach to 
achieving full employment.    
 As a bottom-up policy, the ELR would also provide a safety net for those who are 
generally last hired and first fired. Targeting certain disadvantaged groups (the young, the 
                                                
15 Pavlina Tcherneva. “Employer of Last Resort.” 1. 
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elderly, women, the long term unemployed) is a common objective of such a policy.16 As 
discussed before, pro-growth policies tend to favor those in high-skilled sectors, in hopes of 
success trickling down to lower-skilled industries and workers. However, the ELR can be much 
more direct in closing the demand gap for labor by guaranteeing work for these disenfranchised 
groups.17 
 The ELR would also act as a buffer stock. When the economy contracts and people are 
laid off from the private sector, the government, by expanding their expenditure, can hire those 
who have lost their jobs. However, once the economy recovers, these people can be hired back 
out into the private sector, decreasing public expenditure. This, in effect, stabilizes the price of 
the stock, or wages in this particular case. In order for a person to move into the private sector, 
the private wages must be at a margin above the wage of the EGP. Low wage employers will 
experience either a one-time increase in wages or cease to exist.18 Therefore, these wages would 
act as an effective minimum wage. For the United States, a livable minimum wage may come in 
around $12 per hour, equating to an annual salary of roughly $25,000 per person.19 Also, by 
stabilizing wages, which are a cost in every commodity in the economy, the program can also 
help to stabilize prices.20 
 Going along with this idea, ELR programs would act as a loose labor market. The 
program needs to be flexible enough in order to allow for an influx of workers when demand in 
the private sector falls, but also allow for exiting when demand in the private sector increases. 
The program would, in effect, provide stabilization and full employment by hiring people into 
                                                
16 Pavlina Tcherneva. “Job or Income Guarantee?” Kansas City. Missouri: University of Missouri. August 
2003. 2. 
17 Pavlina Tcherneva. “Employer of Last Resort.” 2. 
18 Ibid. 2-3. 
19 Pavlina Tcherneva. “Obama’s Job Creation Promise: A Modest Proposal to Guarantee That He Meets 
and Exceeds Expectations.” The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College. 2009. 5. 
20 Pavlina Tcherneva. “Employer of Last Resort.” 3.  
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socially useful projects. Whereas pro-investment and growth policies only lead to further 
instability, which is shown through the most recent recession, a flexible ELR would allow for 
stability within the labor market.21 
 Simple welfare and transfer programs often leave the poor to idle and lose all human 
capital, making them effectively unemployable. However, because people are able to work, 
EGPs can help to maintain and increase capital for the poor. They are given the chance and 
incentive to mobilize and work for the common good. Additionally, an effective ELR program 
would provide on the job training and education to help employees prosper in post-ELR life. The 
work of these employees would also have good social impacts, as they would be able to perform 
the work that the private sector often fails to do.22 
 As opposed to policies that attempt to increase aggregate demand to a level that allows 
for full employment to be met, the level of spending needed for an ELR program would be much 
easier to quantify. Because there are many subjective variables that go into demand, finding an 
appropriate level of spending to raise it to where it needs to be for full employment is extremely 
difficult. The ELR program is designed so that the deficit will rise only to the point that 
involuntary employment is eliminated. The government would simply need to spend what it will 
take to employ all those who wish to work. Aggregate demand will, therefore, not become 
excessive and would not increase beyond the full employment level.23 
 
1.2.1 Costs and Critiques of ELR Programs 
 Opponents of EGPs often ask how such a program could be affordable in the long run 
and object to the ‘open-ended’ fiscal commitment entailed in job guarantee programs. Many 
                                                
21 Tcherneva. “Employer of Last Resort.” 3. 
22 Ibid. 4. 
23 L. Randall Wray. “The Employer of Last Resort Approach to Full Employment.” 5-6. 
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argue that rich and internationally dominant countries such as the United States can afford such a 
program, but this may not be true for smaller, weaker nations. However, post-Keynesian 
economists argue that for countries with sovereign currencies and floating exchange rates, an 
ELR program can be financially sustainable in the long run.24 This is based off of the idea of 
“modern money,” or the modern monetary theory. The open market operations, which vary 
country by country and allow the central bank and government to manipulate the interest rate and 
the supply of base money, provides mechanisms that allow a country to meet fiscal 
responsibilities. By merely providing the currency, the government can buy anything for sale in 
terms of its own currency. The government does not need to tax or borrow to spend, in fact, 
spending needs to come first. Therefore, countries with free-floating nonconvertible currencies 
are not at risk of insolvency or technical constraints in funding ELR programs indefinitely.25  
 Not only can such policies be sustainable in the long run, but job guarantee programs can 
also be more cost-effective and essentially “cheaper” than most of their poverty reduction 
counter-parts. In January 2009, the Obama Administration unveiled its signature initiation, the 
$787 billion American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). The effects of the act came 
slowly, and eventually 3-4 million jobs were created. Although, this hasn’t kept the 
unemployment rate from rising above a level of 8.1 percent, where it stood in 2009.26 Around 
$550 billion of this plan went towards stimulus spending, essentially costing the government 
$157,000 per job created. Obviously not all of this money went towards salaries, but rather a 
large portion leaked into the economy as subsidies, unemployment insurance, and private 
                                                
24 L. Randall Wray. “Macroeconomic Stability. Affordability and Manageability of Employer of Last 
Resort Programmes.” University of Missouri-Kansas City. July 7. 2008. 102.  
25 L. Randall Wray. “The Employer of Last Resort Approach to Full Employment.” 2-3. 
26 Philip Harvey. “Back to Work: A Public Jobs Proposal for Economic Recovery.” Demos. 1-2. 
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contracts for public works. Therefore, the amount of money left over for salaries is quite small, 
making President Obama’s plan quite expensive.27  
 In contrast, a recent proposal for a job guarantee program by Philip Harvey provides 
more than 1 million jobs at a fraction of the cost. Harvey proposes a total budget of $46.4 billion 
per year for such a scheme. This spending would trigger a multiplier effect and indirectly create 
an additional 414,00 jobs on top of the already 1 million generated. However, Harvey also 
estimates that a job creation program would add revenues and savings for the government, 
making the net total cost for the program a mere $28.6 billion.28 Table 1 of the Appendix depicts 
Harvey’s proposal. Each job created by the government, therefore, would come in around 
$21,000, a fraction of what each job generated under the ARRA costs. A job guarantee policy 
can be consistent with the objectives of President Obama’s plan – to create socially useful jobs 
for the disenfranchised – while remaining much more cost-effective.  
 However, some critics of job guarantees, namely economist Malcolm Sawyer, argue that 
such programs create employment by raising aggregate demand. Therefore, the benefits seen 
through an EGP can also be achieved through fiscal policies such as Obama’s plans to cut taxes 
and increase government spending. Although advocates of job guarantees accept the argument 
that unemployment in capitalist economics results from insufficient aggregate demand, they do 
not accept the belief that “pump-priming” of demand is an effective solution.29 In a response to 
Sawyer’s assertions about job guarantees, Randall Wray and William Mitchell write, “The JG 
does not maintain ‘full employment’ simply by pumping demand - one could envision a 
government policy that deflated aggregate demand (by raising taxes and cutting overall 
                                                
27 Pavlina Tcherneva. “Obama’s Job Creation Promise: A Modest Proposal to Guarantee that he Meets 
and Exceeds Expectations.” 4. 
28 Philip Harvey. “Back to Work: A Public Jobs Proposal for Economic Recovery.” 10-11. 
29 William Michell and L. Randall Wray. “Full Employment through Job Guarantee: A Response to 
Critics.” Center of Full Employment and Equity. January 2009. 3. 
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spending) even as it phased-in a JG to achieve full employment.”30 As discussed before, Wray 
and Mitchell do not believe that increasing aggregate demand can sufficiently “trickle down” 
jobs to where they are most needed.  
 Malcolm Sawyer has also stated that EGPs, at best, only lead to replacing unemployment 
with underemployment. The International Labor Organization (ILO) attempts to define 
underemployment by splitting it into two categories: visible and invisible underemployment. 
Visible refers to time related underemployment, and invisible refers to when workers are not 
fully utilizing their skills and capabilities. Because EGPs are generally designed to be sensitive 
to worker time constraints, time-related underemployment would not occur. Therefore, Wray and 
William Mitchell infer that Sawyer is alluding to “invisible underemployment.” Sawyer provides 
a neoclassical-inspired human capital theory in which he compares the implied productivity of 
the EGP job (q) to the ‘true’ productivity of the worker in a different job (Q). Sawyer states that 
q<Q because “ELR jobs are low-skill, low-productivity jobs,” and thus replaces unemployment 
with underemployment.31 
 Proponents of the ELR, however, see productivity as being socially determined, not 
solely as a characteristic of the individual worker. Wray and Mitchell write, 
 The design of jobs under a JG has to ensure the positions are accessible to the most 
 disadvantaged workers in the labour market, for it is they who typically bear the brunt 
 of unemployment. In that sense if productivity resides in the individual (as in human  
 capital theory) as opposed (more realistically) to being the outcome of a complex mix of 
 individual characteristics, team-based collaboration, on-the-job training, and job design 
 and management, then it is highly likely that q will approximate Q, for most individuals 
 who will rely on JG employment for anything other than short transitional 
 unemployment.32 
 
                                                
30 William Michell and L. Randall Wray. “Full Employment through Job Guarantee: A Response to 
Critics.” 3. 
31 Ibid. 8-9. 
32 Ibid.  9. 
  
14 
However, underemployment may occur if a professional worker were to be laid off and are 
forced to take a job under the EGP that does not benefit their skills. It is more likely, however, 
that frictional unemployment will occur in these types of situations. Many of these workers who 
are laid off will receive some type of severance pay, which provides a disincentive to 
immediately take on an EGP job. Mitchell and Wray point out that this unemployment will 
discipline wage demands in the private sector. In these situations, underemployment caused by 
inadequacies in the labor market will then be reduced.33 
 In his article against the implementation of ELR programs, Sawyer further notes that 
there are considerable barriers to high employment, one being inflationary tendencies, which he 
says ELR proposals do not account for.34 This idea of employment causing inflation comes from 
the theory of the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU), which states that 
there is a level of unemployment that must be maintained in order to keep inflation in check. 
However, Wray argues that an ELR program can be designed in order to keep the NAIRU at 
zero. He writes,  
 If the government decides to spend its way to full employment, it has to decide what it 
 is going to buy. If the government is going to try to get to full employment by ordering 
 high tech “starwars” missiles, I would guess that NAIRU would indeed be very high--
 maybe 7 or 8%, or maybe even twice that, in the USA. If on the other hand, government 
 tries to achieve full employment by hiring unskilled labor in something like an ELR 
 program, then NAIRU can be zero.35 
 
This comes back to Minsky’s idea of providing work to low-skilled workers rather than 
attempting to conform them to our economy. A well-implemented job guarantee program can 
account for such inflationary tendencies.  
 
                                                
33 Ibid. 
34 Malcolm Sawyer. “Employer of Last Resort: Could It Deliver Full Employment and Price Stability?” 
Journal of Economic Issues Vol. 37, No. 4 (December 2003). 906.  
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1.3 Implementing Employment Guarantees with a Gender Perspective 
 The main objective of an EGP is the alleviation of poverty through employment and 
productive assets to poor communities. Because women make up the majority of the nearly 1.3 
billion people living in poverty worldwide, this disenfranchised group stands to gain the most 
from such a social protection. Further, men and women often experience poverty differently. 
When it comes to economic vulnerabilities, women are often paid less, have higher employment 
insecurity and low education/literacy that keep them in low-skilled casual work, constraints 
balancing household responsibilities and paid work, and encounter mobility constraints.36 
Although this is quite evident in many countries across the world, a review of the 
implementation of EGPs in developing countries indicates that many have taken on gender-
sensitive strategies, yet limit the number of mechanisms in their designs. Some key concerns 
include: inadequate attention to women’s care work responsibilities, weak representation of 
women in decision-making structures, gender-biased payment methods, targeting of household 
heads, and reinforcement of gendered norms when deciding which tasks should be taken on.37 
Therefore, in order to reduce poverty and the economic vulnerabilities that women face, EGPs 
must be constructed with a gendered perspective.   
 
1.3.1 Breaking down Barriers 
 One such way that countries have attempted to target and benefit women is through the 
implementation of explicit quotas for female participants. This method could possibly help to 
break down entry-barriers that women typically face in the labor market. Enacted in 2004, South 
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Africa’s Expanded Public Works Program (EPWP) was implemented as a medium-term active 
labor market policy, aimed at creating 1 million jobs over a period of five years.38 This program 
was expanded with the objective of creating 4.5 million work opportunities that would halve 
unemployment by 2014.39 The EPWP was first implemented with a female participation quota of 
60 percent, and later reduced to a level of 40 percent.40 In their 2010-2011 annual report, the 
Department of Public Works for the Republic of South Africa recorded that women made up 62 
percent of all EPWP participants.41 
 However, some skeptics believe that gender quotas are impossible to achieve with these 
types of programs because of the arduous and taxing nature of the work that is offered.42 Many 
EGPs look to implement works that provide some type of social benefit to communities. This 
often takes the form of infrastructure projects such as road maintenance or dam construction that 
requires heavy manual labor. Therefore, the nature of work also needs to be taken into account 
when formulating EPG policies. Although (presumably male) heads of households were initially 
targeted in Argentina’s Jefes program, the female participation rate of this program reached up to 
74 percent. This was due to the nature of the community-oriented and social work that was 
offered.43 
 That is not to say, however, that women should be segregated into these social works. 
Rather, women should be involved in a variety of tasks. Stephen Devereux and Colette Solomon 
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discussed just this in their paper on the international experience of employment programs: 
“Where local gender norms do not allow for women’s involvement in labour-intensive labour, it 
might be strategic to use the traditional gender divisions of labour as an entry point. Gradually, 
women’s tasks on the programme might be expanded to include ‘non-traditional’ tasks.”44 
However, some may argue that this strategy will only lead to reinforcing gender stereotypes and 
augmenting occupational segregation. To remedy this, programs that implement this type of 
strategy need to make sure that additional training is offered so that women can gain new skills 
that they otherwise would not have learned in the private sector market. The main objective of 
the Public Works and Employment Project implemented in Burkina Faso in 1991 was to “reduce 
under-employment by the financing of small urban labor-intensive works.”45 Although women 
generally engaged in the collection and transportation of sand and gravel, training eventually 
allowed them to make cement blocks, a job originally reserved for men.46 By providing this 
training, the gender norms that existed in the Burkina Faso society were altered. This helped to 
break down barriers into the labor market for female workers.  
 The way in which women are recruited into EGPs can also help attract them into the 
works. Many recruitment strategies take the gender-neutral stance and assume that men and 
women will respond in the same way. However, women in developing nations tend to be much 
less mobile than men, are not frequenters of administrative centers and are, therefore, less likely 
to see jobs posting available only at village centers or construction sites.47 In order to make 
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recruitment strategies more gender sensitive, a program must take into account the local 
administrative structures and practices as well as local norms and traditions.48 
 
1.3.2 Gendered Payment Systems 
 The wage system that is implemented within an employment program must also be 
considered in order to prevent discrimination against women. Although many EGPs have created 
provisions for equal wages, work allocation tends to be gender-biased and occupational 
segregation can occur, which may lead to women being paid less.49 As discussed, women may 
tend to take on different jobs than men and programs designers may be tempted to set different 
wages for different tasks. Therefore, because a woman may be forced to take on work that is 
“lighter” than a man’s work, they can potentially receive a lower wage. Women may also need to 
work shorter hours in order to tend to domestic work, further decreasing their pay. One way to 
prevent this would be to set up single-day task rates where both the wage and the work norm are 
fixed. This is done by setting a task that can be finished by most women and men within 6-8 
hours and eliminates the risk of one sex being paid more at the end of the day. The gender 
composition of work groups may also be taken into consideration. Mixed-sex groups make 
people with different capabilities depend on each other to complete a task, which could further 
help to avoid discrimination.50 
 Payment systems for job guarantees should also focus on individual payments. Many 
EGPs have tended to focus on the household as an entity, which influences decisions on how 
income is distributed and paid. In Ethiopia’s Public Safety Net Program (PSNP), payment was 
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sent to household heads, which meant in male-headed households, the men received this 
payment directly even if the woman performed the work. Women have less independent access 
to finances and, in return, less access to credit and other financial services.  Program designs 
should, therefore, remove institutional barriers to women’s access to productive inputs, credit, 
and markets. This will allow women to move from meeting just basic survival needs and out of 
poverty, especially for females who are heads of their households.51 
 In terms of setting an appropriate wage to attract women into the work force, there have 
been discussions on the practice of self-targeting through setting low wage levels. Amelita 
Dejardin – an International Labor Organization official – writes, 
 Public works programmes have the potential for screening the poor because they  impose 
 the cost of foregone income which is lower for the poor. There is a lack of  empirical 
 information on how male and female labour responds to different levels and modes of 
 payment or to what extent poor women may have been denied access to employment in 
 function of the level or mode of payment in public works programmes. However, given 
 that women tend to be less mobile (migration is predominantly male) and have fewer 
 income options, and that women workers generally come from the poorest (therefore 
 food insecure) households, one can assume that the opportunity cost (in terms of foregone 
 income) would tend to be lower among poor women. At higher wage levels poor women 
 would probably face stiffer competition with other potential job seekers.52 
 
What Dejardin is arguing is that with a lower EGP wage, women would have easier access into 
the labor market. However, this process does have obvious limitations. This method would 
effectively set the wage at an agricultural wage level, and perhaps lower, which are often 
insufficient in lifting the poor from poverty. Therefore, other targeting measures should be used 
in order to find an appropriate wage to pull women out of poverty. These include, “careful 
selection of poor areas, special targeting clauses in contracts with private contractors or 
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executing institutions, or special selection criteria for particularly vulnerable or disadvantaged 
groups.”53 
 Poor households, especially those who are headed by women may also prefer provisions 
as opposed to wages. When given cash, there tends to be higher transactions costs (time and 
travel to the market) than receiving food for payment. In the late 1990’s, Malawi offered two 
employment guarantee programs; one that offered food-for-work and another that provided cash 
wages. A survey found that women were more likely to take up the food-for-work program, 
whereas men made up the majority of participants in the latter program.54 For those whose main 
objective in participating in employment programs is to obtain daily sustenance for their 
families, monthly payments may also be a disincentive for work.55 
 
1.3.3 Gender Budgeting 
 A gender responsive budget occurs when the government formulates their budget while 
taking into account the effect of government revenue and expenditure policies on both men and 
women and on gender relations. Budgets tend to reflect the values of a country and affects men 
and women in different ways, depending on the socio-economic climate of a particular nation.56 
Therefore, the methodology and way that gender-responsive budgets are implemented differ 
from country to country. As Dr. Elizabeth Klatzer of the Watch Group for Gender and Public 
Finance writes, “Budgets (re-)produce gender inequalities and unequal distribution of power 
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between the genders.”57 Therefore, the main objective of a gender-responsive budget is to create 
patterns of public expenditure that promote gender equality. 
 Many developing nations have taken on such a budgeting approach. This may be due to 
the realization that the economic gains of gender equality have led to an increase in output and 
people’s capacities in many cases. The economic empowerment of women has shown to lead a 
country to increased productivity, less stress, and overall better health.58 When designing EGPs, 
it is important to remain gender-aware for these same reasons. In an ILO report on gender issues 
in employment and labor market policies they write, “Gender budgeting can enhance the chances 
of women equitably benefiting from counter-cyclical measures, both in public investment for job 
retention and creation, and expanding social protection, in particular for the poor and the most 
vulnerable.”59 
 
1.3.4 Women with Care Burdens 
 Economist Rania Antonopoulos asserts in her writings that the vulnerability of women to 
poverty is positively linked to the gender division of paid and unpaid work.60 Unpaid work 
consists of any work securing inputs for household production and providing care for family 
members, whereas paid work refers to time contracted out that receives compensation. Women 
are generally overly taxed and uncompensated for unpaid work and therefore, the overhead-
unpaid work time performed creates an asymmetry between them and the rest of the 
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population.61 This forms yet another obstacle to female entry into the labor market. For example, 
when a road improvement project was implemented in Tanzania, many of the female non-
participants stated that although they had a desire to take party in the project, they had little time 
to do so because of their commitment to household duties.62 Additionally, in a recent study in 
Latin America, countries showed that over half of the women aged 20 to 24 stated that their 
responsibilities at home were their main reasoning behind not seeking a job in the labor market.63 
 Further, those in developing countries tend to spend more time on unpaid subsistence 
work, as larger segments of the population have access to the labor market in wealthier countries. 
It has been found that public sector infrastructure and state provisioning regimes play a large role 
in the specific allocation of time among a variety of unpaid tasks.64 Therefore, in countries 
implementing poverty alleviation programs such as EGPs, these schemes could help to further 
mitigate the burden of unpaid work facing women in many developing nations.  
 One of the stated objectives of EGPs is to provide jobs that produce a good that benefits 
the community as a whole. As discussed before, these jobs often take the form of infrastructure 
projects such as construction and road maintenance. However, if projects are not gender 
informed, this could create a “double” day effect for women. In order to help alleviate the burden 
of unpaid work that face women and avoid the “double day”, EPGs should put jobs in place that 
result in the following: 
 “(a) Asset creation that facilitates gaining access to goods that are gathered from 
 communal lands through unpaid work, such as water and firewood (b) assets that 
 enhance productivity in subsistence unpaid work and unpaid family work of products 
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 destined to reach markets (c) direct replacement of unpaid work in the area of public 
 service delivery of care.”65 
 
More attention to the creation of jobs to help relieve the strain of unpaid work would help attract 
women into the workforce. However, I am not arguing that women necessarily have to perform 
these social sector jobs. Men may also take on these jobs, perhaps altering the gender relations 
within a household.66  
 One such provision is the creation of professional care-facilities. Certain women who 
may be more labor-constrained, such as older women or women with disabilities could take on 
these jobs and be remunerated for their work.67 As discussed before, South Africa’s EPWP has 
had a lot of success attracting female participants. This may be attributed to the extensive social 
sector projects that have been a part of the program since its inception, which include Early 
Childhood Development and Community and Home Based Care. The EPWP has also been 
phasing in a second social sector component with jobs that include teacher aides, sports 
facilitation, home repairs, and garbage recycling.68 
 The creation of social infrastructure should also be put in place in conjunction with the 
construction of physical infrastructure. Antonopoulos provides the following example, 
 Encouraging educational attainment requires a suitable physical space for schooling. 
 Yet, school attendance will fail if girls are required to help their families in taking care 
 of the chronically ill at home, as is often the case in households with people living 
 with HIV/AIDS in many parts of the world and in Sub-Saharan Africa in particular.69 
 
Although you can create jobs through the construction of hospitals, they would be rendered 
useless without doctors, nurses, receptionists, and maintenance workers. Governments supplying 
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jobs such as these would add a much-needed social benefit while also taking an extra 
responsibility off of women with additional care burdens. 
 Not only should the jobs being offered and the assets created by EGPs help women with 
unpaid work, but on-the-job measures that reflect an understanding of particular needs of women 
should also be taken. As mentioned before, professional care-facilities can be set up to help with 
childcare during work hours. It would also be beneficial to place these facilities on job sites in 
order to help with the limited time mothers have to transport their children and also to aid in 
breast-feeding purposes. Certain programs entitle women to a set amount of minuets per day for 
breastfeeding, in addition to their lunch break without the fear of a pay cut.70 In Botswana, the 
Labour-Based Relief Programme, which has a 60-70% female participation rate, allowed women 
to breastfeed without any pay-cut implications.71 
 The convenience of jobs also must be taken into account when formulating employment 
programs. Timing and location of work is imperative to attracting women out of the household. 
If working hours were limited to times when children were at school or care was available, and 
also near the home to decrease the costs of transportation, this would be much more sensitive to 
women’s care burdens. In order to create the best policies, designers of these programs should 
consult with local women and allow them to be involved in the decision-making process. This 
would allow a greater number of women to participate in such programs.72 
 
1.4 Identifiable Benefits for Women 
 As shown before, EGPs have a number of positive benefits for a nation and its people, 
from providing a better macroeconomic stabilizer, to guaranteeing full employment, and also 
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providing a safety net to those most vulnerable to unemployment. The strategies discussed above 
would help EGPs to target those most vulnerable, women. As I have noted, many countries that 
have implemented EGPs have provided a few mechanisms in order to directly affect this 
marginalized group. Although countries often fall short of supplying the necessary amount of 
provisions to fully benefit women, these programs are often extremely beneficial to women on 
an individual, household, and community level. This section will identify such benefits for 
women. 
 
1.4.1 General Impacts on Women 
 Because women can find reliable and convenient work through job guarantee programs, 
this has increased the opportunity to engage in economic activities. As shown, many EGPs 
across the world have had a relatively high proportion of female participants. In Figures 1 and 2 
of the Appendix, we see these high participation rates in both Argentina’s Jefes Program and 
South Africa’s EPWP. Both programs have seen not only a high rate of female participants, but 
also a majority of women taking on these works.  
 By setting a wage floor for all, these programs also help women generate income for 
themselves and their families and help them to potentially move out of poverty.73 One study 
found that female participants in Burundi’s job guarantee program made 20 percent higher 
incomes than non-participating females.74 Females who participated in Ethiopia’s program also 
suggested that the program allowed them to move out of work as domestic employees in nearby 
towns, jobs that often provided low wages and abuse by employers.75 Additionally, Argentina’s 
Jefes program was successful in reducing indigence rates, which is extreme poverty measured in 
                                                
73 Rania Antonoplous (2007). 16. 
74 Stephen Devereux and Colette Solomon. 25. 
75 Rebecca Holmes and Nicola Jones. “Rethinking social protection using a gender lens.” 20. 
  
26 
income necessary to purchase the minimum amount of food calories per day. Only four months 
after implementation, the indigence rates among participants fell by 25 percent.76 A provision of 
equal wages that most programs have taken on has also allowed governments to tackle and 
improve the gendered wage disparities often seen in the labor market.77  
 Women have also gained more access to credit and loans through participation in these 
programs.78 Greater access to credit is not only important for women’s equality and 
independence,79 but it also has helped smooth income and increase expenditures on household 
goods such as food, health, and education.80 This can potentially help improve the health an 
education of themselves and their families. 
 As noted before, whereas a welfare program consisting of cash transfers may diminish 
human capital, EGPs tend to promote the improvement of skills and knowledge. This has been 
especially evident for women participating in job guarantees. During South Africa’s Labour-
Intensive Public Works program, which was implemented a few years prior to the EPWP, 
women participants started community gardens after receiving appropriate training and were able 
to sell their vegetables and flowers for cash, in addition to their EGP wage.81 Workers who 
participated in South Africa’s EPWP also received ‘on-the-job Hard Skills Training,’ which 
included courses on “Life Skills”, “HIV/AIDS Awareness, “Managing My Personal Finances, 
“Career Guidance,” and “Environmental Awareness.”82 
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 Additionally, some countries have experienced an ideological shift in how women are 
seen in the household, which has allowed them to reach a higher status in not only their homes, 
but also their communities. In Ethiopia, shifts in the division of labor between men and women 
within the household have been noted. 83 Women who participated in Ethiopia’s program also 
agreed that they now received greater respect from their husbands since participating in public 
works. Holmes and Jones write, “In some cases, men had also started to consult women on 
selling livestock in the market and to help women with traditional ‘female’ chores such as 
fetching water and grinding grain.”84 Further, women have reported that participation in such 
programs has helped to reduce tensions within a household, namely violent reactions from their 
husbands.85 This may be due to a decrease in stresses related to income and a reduction in unpaid 
work pressures.   
 As stated earlier, EGPs have been proven to be stepping-stones in allowing women to 
perform traditionally male work. The breaking of this rigid division between labor for men and 
women has widened the opportunities for women’s employment in supervisory positions. In 
Botswana, the program made progress in putting women in supervisory and technical positions.86 
Dejardin writes, “It registered an increasing percentage of women among its trainees and 
graduates of courses for gang leaders, senior gang leaders, technical officers and assistants 
within the period 1981-1990.”87 Because women are able to step into these higher-skilled jobs, 
this may allow them to transfer these new abilities into higher paying jobs in the private sector.  
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 An increase in social capital has also been a result of such programs. For example, 
women have gained greater access to informal credit from community members because being 
part of such a program is a guarantee that the loans will be repaid. Because of their newfound 
economic stability, women have also been able to participate in social networks such as religious 
and traditional ceremonies. In Bangladesh, participants highlighted not only the fact that elite 
village members are now more likely to offer financial support but also that they were better able 
to access social networks within their neighborhoods. 88 
 
1.4.2 Benefits for Women with Care Burdens 
 As discussed, for many EPGs implemented around the world, women have participated in 
very high rates, equaling and even surpassing that of men. This points to not only the existence 
of unemployment among women but also hidden unemployment in the “inactive” population.89 
This “inactive” population depicts those women who have been placed with the responsibilities 
of tending to household work and have no time or energy to enter into the labor market. Women 
with care burdens often face significant barriers into the labor market, but EGPs help to break 
down that barrier and such programs have allowed women to leave the home and enter the 
workforce.  
 The increases in women’s income as a result of job guarantees have also been connected 
to improving the health and education outcomes of children and entire households. A review of 
effects on children in Niger depicts this outcome.90 Data from three rural sites in Niger showed 
that an increase in women’s participation in public works programs was strongly correlated to an 
increase in weight-for-age children. The study also found a positive impact on child nutrition. 
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Further, it was concluded that the participation of men within these programs had no effect on 
child health.91 In Argentina, in order to be eligible for Jefes, the participant had to provide proof 
that their children were attending school. This type of provision can help to achieve positive 
impacts for women and their families in the long-term.92 
 
1.5 Conclusion 
 EGPs have shown to be a better macroeconomic stabilizer and much more cost effective 
than pro-growth and investment policies aimed at alleviating poverty. However, a closer 
examination also shows that these programs can have positive social effects, including reducing 
gender disparity. Women who have participated in EGPs have seen an increase in economic 
opportunities, skills and knowledge, respect within the household, increased social capital, and 
greater possibilities of obtaining supervisory roles. By being offered the opportunity to leave the 
home and perform socially useful work, women have been able to pull themselves and those that 
they care for out of poverty. However, in order to maximize the positive effect on women, policy 
makers must keep a gender perspective in mind. Without considering the barriers that women 
face on a daily basis, gendered payment systems and budgeting, and also the burden of 
household work, EGPs may not have the same positive impacts they have shown to have for 
women. In the following section, I will be discussing the world’s largest job guarantee scheme, 
The NREGA, and the effects it has made on this developing nation and one of its most 
disenfranchised groups, women. 
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Chapter 2: Gender and the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 
 
2.1 An Overview: The NREGA 
 The Second Prime Minister of the Republic of India, Lal Bahadur Shastri, once stated, 
“Of all the problems facing us, none is more distressing than that of poverty in which tens of 
millions of our countrymen continue to live.” Since the 1980’s, the poverty rate in India has 
continued to fall, from 44.93 percent in 1983, to 36.02 percent in 1993-1994 and to 28.27 percent 
in 2004-2005.93 However, despite the fact that the India’s economy has grown by more than 8 
percent within the last decade, the level of poverty is still quite significant. The challenge that 
has faced policy makers is that of poverty at the bottom, or chronic poverty. This usually entails 
severe poverty in which the poor are frequently marginalized, vulnerable and suffer from 
multiple deprivations.94 
 In order to help combat the high levels of poverty that has plagued India for decades, the 
NREGA was enacted in 2005 under the United Progressive Alliance government. As the front 
page of its website stipulates, the aim of the NREGA is to enhance the livelihood and security of 
people in rural areas by guaranteeing 100 days of wage-employment in a financial year to a 
household with adult members willing to perform unskilled manual labor. The act was initially 
implemented in the 200 poorest districts and was expanded to all rural districts in 2008.95 
 India is not new to the concept of employment guarantee programs. In 1977, the state of 
Maharashtra formulated the Maharastra Employment Guarantee Act. The act stipulated that 
wage employment would be granted to all those who demanded it, giving a framework for future 
                                                
93 Rania Antonopoulos and Indira Hirway. ed. Unpaid Work and the Economy: Gender. Time Use. and 
Poverty in Developing Countries. 30. 
94 Ibid. 30. 
95 Sukti Dasgupta and Ratna M. Sudarshan. “Issues in labour market inequality and women’s participation 
in India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee Programme.” International Labour Office, Geneva. 
February 2011. 3. 
  
31 
execution of the NREGA.96 In 1993, the United Nations Development Program wrote that the 
Maharastra scheme was one of the largest public works programs in the developing world. The 
scheme guaranteed employment at a defined wage, which was an unprecedented feature in such 
programs being implemented around the world.97 The NREGA followed suit with a similar 
structure. Besides the fact that the NREGA is a ‘national’ scheme, the EGP departs from the 
Maharastra plan in one other very important way: its rights based approach. The NREGA has 
been put into India’s Constitution and guarantees employment as a right, rather than merely 
providing a social safety net.98 India is the first country in history to provide legal enforcement of 
work as a fundamental right to life.   
 As a functioning EGP, work under the NREGA is meant to be demand-based. If a person 
wishes to take part in the scheme, they must apply for registration, obtain a job card, and seek 
employment through a written application.99 The state governments are then obliged to provide 
work for these job seekers. By law, the Gram Panchayats – the village assembly – must provide 
work within 15 days of the request. If the Panchayat fails to do so, they must provide the worker 
with an unemployment benefit, which gives them a further incentive to run an effective 
program.100 
 As far as funding is concerned, the Central Government is responsible for the entire cost 
of wages for unskilled manual workers and 75 percent of the cost of material and wages for 
skilled and semi-skilled workers. State governments bear the other 25 percent of the cost for 
these workers. The Central Government also bears the costs of administrative expenses, which 
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include the salary and allowances of Program Officers, along with their support staff, and work 
site facilities. The state authorities are additionally responsible for the unemployment allowance 
discussed above and the administrative expenses of the State and Employment Guarantee 
Council.101 Because the program is demand driven, the release of Central Government funds is 
based on the projection of labor demand in the agreed-to Labor Budget. The funds are, therefore, 
based on anticipated demand rather than a predetermined allocation.102 In 2013, the cost of the 
program to the Central government was merely .3 percent of the country’s GDP.103 
 In order to avoid misallocation or misuse of these funds, stipulations have been placed 
within the act to help increase transparency. The act mandates that at least 50 percent of the 
works performed must be done through the Gram Panchayat, rather than private contractors.104 
In 2005, the government implemented the Right to Information Act, prior to the NREGA. The 
act is aimed at strengthening transparency within the government and with implementation of the 
NREGA, any citizen now has the right to request information from a public authority on the 
scheme.105 The government also put in place social auditing, monitoring and evaluation systems 
to keep track of the way the program was being handled within local governments. These 
governments, therefore, had a duty to inform its people. With the implementation of social 
                                                
101 The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 2005. Operational Guidelines. Ministry of Rural 
Development. 30.  
102 Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act. 2005. Operational Guidelines 2013. 
Ministry of Rural Development. 99. 
103 Nita Bhalla. “Economists urge Modi not to squeeze NREGA for rural poor.” Reuters. October, 15 
2014. http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/10/15/foundation-india-employment-poor-
idINKCN0I422O20141015. 
104 Operational Guidelines (2013). 17. 
105 Sukti Dasgupta and Ratna M. Sudarshan. “Issues in labour market inequality and women’s 
participation in India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee Programme.” 4. 
  
33 
audits, citizens could not only seek information, but also record complaints and make 
suggestions.106 
 Works that are permitted under the NREGA, as per the Works Field Manual, are listed 
below: 
1. Water conservation and water harvesting; 
2. Drought proofing (including afforestation and tree plantation); 
3. Irrigation canals including micro and minor irrigation works; 
4. Provision of irrigation facility, horticulture plantation and land development facilities to 
land owned by households belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes of 
below poverty line families or to the beneficiaries of land reforms or to the beneficiaries 
under the Indira Awas Yojana of the Government of India or that of the small farmers or 
marginal farmers as defined in the Agriculture Debt Waiver and Debt Relief Scheme, 
2008; 
5. Renovation of traditional water bodies including disitlting of tanks; 
6. Land development 
7. Flood control and protection of works including drainage in water logger areas;  
8. Rural connectivity to provide all-weather access; and  
9. Any other work, which may be notified by the Central Government in consultation with 
the State Government.107 
 
In order for a work (other than those that fall into one of the above categories) to be performed, it 
must meet a multitude of criteria. Under the NREGA mandate, the work must include the 
creation of a durable asset that strengthens the livelihood of the rural poor and must also be taken 
up within a rural area. The costs of materials for such project must not exceed the 60:40 wage to 
material ratio laid out in the act and the labor performed must be done manually and not by 
machines. Further, the state will not allow any work that will engage a contractor for the 
implementation.108 The works described above have helped to bring a number of positive effects 
to India, including important macroeconomic, environmental, and social impacts. 
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2.1.2 Overall Impact of the NREGA 
 Since its implementation in 2006, the NREGA has had numerous effects throughout 
India. One of the most important stated goals of the program has been the generation of 
employment. Not only have NREGA works directly increased employment, but they have also 
indirectly affected employment through the increase of irrigation provisioning, area under crops, 
and crop production. In a study done by the Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore in 2013, it was 
found that of the 40 villages studied, the average number of days of employment increased by a 
range of 34 to 73 percent since the scheme’s inception. This included both direct employment 
under the program and indirect employment in the private sector.109 The NREGA has also 
created opportunities for large-scale employment of skilled laborers at the block and/or village 
level through the use of engineers, village assistants, accountants, and information technology 
personnel. Similarly to the indirect effects in the unskilled sector, the NREGA has also provided 
employment indirectly for skilled laborers because of newly opened up business avenues 
including postal networks, financial services, and information and communication technology 
services.110 
 Participation under the NREGA has also proven to have positive impacts on income and 
wages for rural workers. As discussed in the first chapter, in order for the private sector to 
remain competitive and attract workers, their wages must be raised at a margin above the EGP 
pay. When it was first implemented, wages under the program were linked to the minimum wage 
in each state, providing a base wage. Because of this, wages have risen significantly across all 
states. Table 2 of the Appendix shows this phenomenon. Since the scheme’s creation, private 
sector wages in rural India have grown exponentially and in most recent years, passed the 
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NREGA wage. The stability of the mandated NREGA minimum wage to all workers has given 
participants greater bargaining power in the private sector. This has helped to raise and stabilize 
the wages across rural India. These wage effects will be discussed in further detail in the 
following sections.   
 As discussed in the preceding chapter, an EGP can have wide ranging counter-cyclical 
effects. Besides employment and wages, multiple other macroeconomic effects have been 
observed due to expenditure on the NREGA. In a study done by the Institute of Economic 
Growth, the economic impact of social protection programs in India was studied. Due to the 
expenditure on NREGA in 2011-2012, total output of the economy increase by a worth of Rs. 
97,712 million due to both direct and indirect effects. The gross value added (GVA) in the 
country also increased by a worth of Rs. 49,309 million. The program has also improved 
government revenue. Because of expenses through NREGA, the government has collected 
additional taxes to the tune of Rs. 6,126.12 million.111 
 The program has also had important social effects. Because work has become much more 
readily available within India’s rural areas, it has helped to decrease migration. In a study done 
on the effects of the NREGA on migration, it showed that the migration of landless or unskilled 
laborers reduced in 29 of the 40 villages studied ranging from 8 to 100 percent.112 Prior to the 
NREGA implementation, during dry seasons when agriculture was not a viable employment 
option for rural workers, many were forced to travel to urban centers or neighboring villages to 
find work. A villager in the Gorakhpur District of Uttar Pradesh noted, 
 After the implementation of the NREGA in our village, we don't have to go to the cities 
 in search of work. There are many types of work that we do here, which includes digging 
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 roads and working in brick factories and drains. This scheme has helped us a lot; now we 
 can manage our families and farmland while working here in our village.113 
 
 The NREGA projects have also shown to improve rural connectivity. Many works related 
to the construction of roads and infrastructure have allowed for greater connectivity between 
villages. This has particularly helped scattered tribes that would have otherwise been left out of 
larger rural network programs. These types of works have also provided villagers with a critical 
link to markets, schools, and health services. Additionally, financial inclusion has improved as a 
result of the scheme. As of 2011, more than ninety million accounts had been opened in banks 
and post offices for NREGA workers, making it the largest financial-inclusion scheme of the 
rural poor.114 
 Many of the works that have been carried out within the NREGA have been linked to 
natural resources such as surface water, ground water, croplands, soils, and wastelands. This has 
led to a number of positive impacts on the environment including effects on water and land 
resources, crop production, and potential impacts on CO2 emissions. In the study performed by 
the India Institute of Science, the following was reported on the program’s effects on water 
resources: 
 Implementation of MGNREGS works such as water conservation and harvesting works, 
 drought proofing, irrigation provisioning and improvement works, and renovation of 
 traditional water bodies have contributed to improved ground water levels, increased 
 water availability for irrigation, increased area irrigated by ground and surface water 
 sources and finally improved drinking water availability for humans and livestock.115 
 
Many of these works include the construction of check dams, percolation takes and distilling of 
tanks. This has helped to make ground water more accessible to farmers and families alike, 
improving crop irrigation and access to drinking water. 
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 Land resources throughout rural India have also benefited from NREGA projects. Many 
of the land development works such as land leveling, pasture development, and drought proofing 
have contributed to improved soil organic carbon and reduced surface runoff and soil erosion. 
The water and land development works have also directly and indirectly helped to increase crop 
production and reduce the risk of crop failure. This has been done by increasing the total area 
that can be cultivated and by also increasing crop diversity and yields. All four of the districts 
studied in the India Institute of Science’s report showed an increase in the total area under 
cultivation. Three of the four districts also made previously uncultivable land now cultivated 
through leveling and clearing practices. Although it is not possible to attribute the increase in 
crop yields to a particular NREGA work, increased water availability for irrigation, land 
development, and improved soil fertility resulting from the works seem to have positively 
impacted these yields. The average crop yields increased by 46 to 100 percent across the 
observed districts.116 
 An increase in soil organic carbon and the raising of tree plantations and fruit orchards 
that has resulted from NREGA works have led to carbon sequestration in biomass and soil. This 
process can possibly contribute to a mitigation of climate change. In the villages studied, 72 
percent of the 899 NREGA beneficiary sample plots showed higher soil organic carbon content 
as compared to the control plots. Additionally, in 31 of the 40 villages, greater forest and fruit 
orchards have been raised, which sequester carbon in biomass and soil.117 However, it would 
take many more years to observe if the program has truly had an impact on CO2 and climate 
change within India.  
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 The NREGA has shown to have numerous impacts on rural India, from increased 
employment and wages to environmental benefits. The program has helped to alleviate many of 
the daily burdens faced by India’s poor. Not only has the scheme helped rural workers as a 
whole, but it has also been successful in targeting certain disadvantaged groups, namely female 
workers. Rural, female workers tend to face high discrimination in the Indian labor market. 
Therefore, formulating NREGA policy that keeps in mind the barriers and burdens that women 
face can help to decrease these discriminatory practices. In the following sections, I will lay out 
the gender-sensitive policies that have been implemented and how this has impacted female 
workers. 
 
2.2 Gender-Sensitive Implementation 
 India is no different from the rest of the world, as women make up the majority of those 
living in poverty. There has been a severe feminization of poverty within India – women have 
lesser means, education and skills, and fewer productive assets.118 The majority of the female 
workforce within in India is concentrated in rural areas. These rural areas are historically much 
more poverty stricken than urban centers and women in the poorer areas of India are more likely 
to seek paid employment than those in wealthier, urban areas. This is due to societal norms and 
patriarchal viewpoints that restrict women’s entry into the labor market. 119 
 The percentage of women working within agriculture has continued to rise over the last 
few decades, as men have begun to move out of this sector. This may be due to the growth of 
agricultural wages compared to non-farm wages. Figure 3 of the Appendix shows that although 
farm wages rose over the period between 1983-2015, it has been unable to keep up with those in 
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the non-farm sector. In fact, the gap between these two groups has only continued to rise.120 
Further, because men typically have greater means to migrate in order to find higher paying 
work, they have been able to move to urban areas where wages are much more significant.   
 The NREGA is an important scheme because it gives women a chance to receive a decent 
wage while working within their villages and in a sector with which they have experience. 
Because such a program would have the strongest impact on women, it is only intuitive that the 
scheme should be geared towards females and implemented with gender issues in mind. In the 
following section, I will explain the ways in which the NREGA has been able to formulate 
policy to best support this marginalized group. 
 
2.2.1 Breaking down Barriers 
 As discussed before, one way that governments have attempted to make EPGs more 
inclusive for women is by the implementation of set participation quotas. The NREGA has taken 
on such policies in attempt to make the program more “gender sensitive.” The act explicitly 
states: “Provided that priority shall be given to women in such a way that at least one-third of the 
beneficiaries shall be women who have registered and requested for work under this Act.”121 
This mandate helps to combat any possible discrimination that can occur when providing works 
for women looking for rural employment. 
 Not only does the act look to provide priority to women searching for work, but it also 
instructs that women take part in the management and monitoring of the program. When the act 
was carried out in 2005, it created the Central Employment Guarantee Council, which was 
designated to establishing a monitoring system and advise the Central Government on all matters 
                                                
120 Ibid. 5-6. 
121 The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005. (Schedule 2 Section 1: 6). 
  
40 
concerning the implementation of the act. It is stipulated that fifteen non-official members are to 
be apart of the council representing Panchayti Raj Institutions, organizations of workers, and 
disadvantaged groups. The act states, “Provided further that not less than one-third of the non-
official members nominated under this clause shall be women.”122 This would allow women to 
have direct access to the Central Government in voicing their concerns or opinions in the 
maintenance of the program.  
 The NREGA also specifies that women should have a role in social auditing. According 
to the Operational Guidelines, social audits include the audit of the quality of works, the details 
of disbursements made, and the number of laborers and materials used. These audits also contain 
a list of grievances. Each state is responsible for performing their own audits and in order to do 
so, a “three-tier vigilance mechanism” containing a state, district, and village cell is incorporated 
into each state auditing system. It is at the local, or village level that women have the most 
power. The guidelines state that women must represent half of the ten members of the Vigilance 
and Monitoring Committee in each village. The report from each committee meeting is provided 
to the Gram Sabha, which is a meeting convened to verify any findings prior to the audit.123 This 
mandate would allow women to take part in their local government and express any issues within 
the program specific to their needs.  
 Women are also given the opportunity to take on supervisory positions within the works 
provided under the NREGA. A worksite supervisor under the act is known as a ‘mate’ and one 
mate is assigned to every 100 workers per site. The guidelines state that when selecting a mate, 
preference should be given to the most deserving women. The mate chosen should preferably be 
an educated woman worker who has worked for at least 50 days under the NREGA within the 
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current financial year.124 The responsibilities of the mate are extensive and range from recording 
daily attendance to facilitating demand for work from individual workers or groups of 
laborers.125 Although women make up the majority of rural workers, even outside of the 
NREGA, it is unlikely that they would be able to achieve such roles and experience without the 
push that the NREGA provides.   
 Lastly, the act also looks to help women in special circumstances. Because the act 
recognizes a single person as a household, it makes it possible for women who may be widowed 
or unmarried able to access the work provided through the act.126 Because of the patriarchal 
hierarchy that plagues much of India, it can sometimes be more difficult for single women to 
find work. However, stipulations such as these can make it easier for women to access wage 
employment. The act also assures that women in highly vulnerable states, such as older women 
or those with physical impairments, can be provided access to works with less physical effort, 
such as taking care of children on worksites.127 
 
2.2.2 Gendered Payment Systems 
 In a country where women face a significant wage gap (up to a 30% difference)128, the 
provision of equal wages spelled out in the act is extremely important. The act stipulates that 
there shall be no discrimination solely on the ground of gender and that all provisions of the 
Equal Remuneration Act of 1976 shall be met.129 As discussed before, in some EGPs, women 
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tend to take on different work than men, which sometimes leads to discrimination in the wages 
provided. Although many of the works provided under the NREGA tend to be labor intensive, 
certain social-sector jobs are available to women who are unable to perform these more arduous 
tasks. The Operational Guidelines of the act lay out that women employed in such positions 
would be paid the remuneration equivalent to the prevailing wage rate and would face no 
prejudice when receiving their payment.130 
 As with social auditing, women are also given a chance to be a part of the payment 
system within their district. Each district can form a payment committee that must have a least 
two female Self Help Group members and three NREGA workers, one of which must be a 
woman. Female Self Help Groups are able to play a direct role in spreading awareness, 
organizing work, accessing entitlements, and assuring social accountability.131 This payment 
committee can bring any concerns or issues they have with the payment system to the District 
Program Coordinator.132 Through this process, women have a voice in airing any grievances or 
mishandlings they have experienced within the wage system.   
 
2.2.3 Women with Care Burdens 
 The NREGA also incorporates a number of stipulations that aim at helping women who 
have taken on some sort of care burden. First is the provision of locally available employment. 
The NREGA reads, “If some applicants have to be directed to report for work beyond 5 km of 
their residence, women (especially single women) and older persons should be given preference 
to work on the work sites nearer to their residence.”133 Additionally, if wage-seekers are forced 
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to travel to worksites more than 5 km away from their homes, they must be provided with an 
additional 10% of their wage. This provides incentives for the state to improve workplace 
proximity. As discussed, the convenience of jobs is extremely important for attracting those with 
household responsibilities out of their homes. Because women may need to transport children to 
school or perform unpaid work within the home before or after hours, transportation time is an 
extremely important aspect to consider. By providing easily accessible work, it is apparent that 
certain gendered issues were kept in mind while formulating NREGA policy.  
 India’s EGP has also implemented important childcare provisions for mothers. The act 
states, “In case the number of children below the age of six years accompanying the women 
working at any site are five or more, provisions shall be made to depute one of such women 
worker to look after such children.”134 Therefore, if five children under the age of six years old 
accompany their mothers to the job site, what is known as a ‘crèche’ – or on-site child care 
facility – is to be provided. Shade for children, periods of rest, and childcare are mandated under 
these circumstances. Again, those who would be looking after the children are meant to be those 
women in special circumstances that are unable to perform more laborious work.135 
 Although the NREGA itself fails to provide maternity leave for women employed under 
the scheme, certain states have been able to enact such benefits. For example, in 2008, the 
government of West Bengal instituted an agreement that stated, 
  “ …the female employees engaged on a contract basis under NREGA…will get the 
 benefit of maternity leave for a maximum period of 135 days and 42 days maternity leave 
 in case of abortion/miscarriage. During the period of maternity leave such female 
 employee will get contractual remuneration as per terms and conditions of the 
 contract.”136 
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Paid maternity leave policies can potentially give further incentives for women to leave the 
household for wage work. If women have comfort knowing that they can start or grow their 
family without fear of penalty, this can attract more women into the Indian workforce.  
 Although some reports on the NREGA have pointed out its lack of a large social services 
sector to help with the unpaid work many rural women face, the highly infrastructure-oriented 
nature of the program may be helping to pull women out of the household and ease the burden of 
unpaid work. In her essay on public policy and unpaid work in India, economist Chakraborty 
notes the following: 
 The policy suggestion arising from this analysis is that infrastructure investment lessens 
 the time stress of women in unpaid SNA activity, but complementary employment 
 guarantee policies are required along with infrastructure investment to ensure the 
 substitution effect of unpaid work with market work, which, in turn, can have impact on 
 household poverty…The point to be noted here is that employment guarantee policies  
 without sufficient public investment in infrastructure can be equally flawed, as women 
 are time poor and better infrastructural facilities are required to release the time locked up 
 in the unpaid activities to have a smooth transition towards market economy.137 
 
She further explains that infrastructure investment that helps with the collection of water has 
especially shown to have alleviation effects on unpaid work. Figure 10 of the Appendix shows 
the ratio of works performed under the NREGA from 2006-2014.138 As one can see, there is a 
relatively even distribution of works being performed, with no work taking up more than 20 
percent of the total. However, two of the major works being performed over this time period 
include Water Conservation and Rural Connectivity. Water conservation works include the 
creation of check dams and water harvesting of village ponds, while rural connectivity helps to 
improve the roads connecting local villages. Both works can potentially help to alleviate the time 
constraint women face traveling and collecting water, reducing the burden of unpaid work.  
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2.2.4 Gender Budgeting 
 India first introduced what is known as the Gender Budget Statement in its 2005-2006 
budget. As discussed, gender budgeting does not refer to creating completely separate budgets 
for men and women, but rather remaining gender aware while formulating expenditure patterns 
and mainstreaming women’s concerns. In India and other developing countries, such actions 
have been evolving and more and more as Indian Ministries have begun to review programs and 
address schemes that have the budgetary potential to impact the needs of women.139 The ministry 
of Rural Development has come to the forefront of providing such gender-perspectives in budget 
preparation.  
 This particular Ministry has implemented several poverty alleviation programs over the 
years, many of them having special components for women and funds that are earmarked as a 
“Women’s Component.” Of the major schemes with such components, the NREGA in particular 
has been able to exercise gender budgeting and evaluate the impact of employment on women.140 
It can be said that many of the gendered policies discussed above display the gender-awareness 
that occurred during the preparation of this act and its budget. In its report on gender budgeting 
in India, the Ministry of Women and Child Development identified the following attributes of 
the NREGA budget as displaying a gender-consciousness: “flexible work norms; women 
friendly tools and appliances; adequate facilities at work site such as medical aid, drinking water, 
crèche and toilet facility.”141 Although the Ministry could do more in terms of gender budgeting, 
simply by providing the funds and mandating such workplace norms, the NREGA has succeeded 
in formulating certain gender-conscious budgetary actions.  
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2.3 Gendered Impacts 
 Women across India, and most notably in many of the rural areas, have faced severe 
economic risks and vulnerabilities for many years. Holmes, Sadana, and Rath provide the 
following statistics that detail the disadvantage women have seen at a national level: 
 India is the lowest ranking country in the South Asian region on the Gender Equality 
 Index, which measures progress in women’s economic activity, empowerment and 
 education (ISST, 2007). On the Gender-Related Development Index (GDI), India is 
 placed at 114 out of 155 countries (2007 data) (UNDP, 2009). The GDI is a composite 
 index measuring average achievement in the three basic dimensions captured in the  
 Human Development Index (HDI) – a long and healthy life, knowledge and a decent 
 standard of living…Indeed, although India’s literacy rate has been increasing, there is a 
 substantial gender gap: in 2007, 54.5% of females were literate compared with 76.9% of 
 males (ibid).142 
 
Because of the lack of progress made for women in India, this has blocked much of their access 
to the labor market and productive assets.  In 2005, the Economic Consensus reported that 
women were about half as likely as men to employed, reporting that women only represented 
about 19.3 percent of the total workforce. When women are employed, however, they tend to 
face a vast wage gap. In the 1999-2000 financial year, wages for rural women were only 65 
percent of male wages.143  
 Women also lack proper accessibility to productive resources and institutions. As shown 
earlier, there has been a stark rise in the amount of female workers in the agricultural sector, as 
men have begun to migrate to urban areas to seek work. However, although they make up the 
majority of the rural workforce, women own less than one-tenth of agricultural lands. 144 Further, 
women often face barriers when acquiring credit, inputs, insurance, etc. As of 2007, only about 
10.7 percent of rural women had a bank or savings account that was solely theirs. Additionally, 
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while about 25 percent of rural women were aware of a micro credit program, only 4.4 percent 
had taken out a loan from such an institution. However, it has been shown that women making 
cash earnings are slightly more likely to acquire bank accounts and loans.145 
 Other than severe obstacles to economic independence and productive assets, women also 
endure hardships at home. Women’s status within the household has very large effects on their 
ability to access work and resources. They often have limited say on major household decisions 
on expenditure, face restricted mobility, and are subject to domestic violence.146 Data has shown 
that a very small proportion of women are able to make decisions on how their own income is 
spent (21 percent) and just over half of women jointly decide with their husbands. However, 
these numbers do differentiate between different castes and religions, with those households 
under the poverty line leaving the majority of the decision making to the male household 
leader.147 
 As women have continued to see serious disadvantages in their homes, the labor market, 
and in their communities, perhaps it is the right to work and government intervention that can 
help to change this tide. As shown in the previous chapter, many other EGPs across the world 
have been successful in pulling women out of their households and granting them economic 
independence and greater respect within their communities and homes. The following section 
will analyze the gendered effects that have occurred in India since the landmark passing of the 
NREGA and whether or not guaranteed employment has had the same positive effects it has for 
women in other parts of the developing world. 
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2.3.1 Participation Rates 
 As noted earlier, women have taken significant advantage of EGPs in programs around 
the world. This phenomenon is no different in India’s case. Although the act mandates that one-
third of beneficiaries be women, this proportion has been surpassed every year the act has been 
implemented. Figure 4 of the Appendix depicts the steady rise in the share of female participants 
in the NREGA, reaching a peak in the 2014-2015 financial year with 55 percent.148 Some may 
argue that this rise in the participation rate can be attributed to a fall in men engaging in the 
program, which is partly true and can be seen in Figure 5. 149 This graph represents the total 
number of participants between 2006-2015 and participants for men and women, as well as total 
expenditure over this time. As one can see, the number of male and female participants dropped 
at seemingly the same rate after a peak in 2009-2010, which explains the stagnation in the share 
of female participants shown in Figure 4 between 2008-2009 and 2011-2012. This drop can 
partially be attributed to a slight decrease and stagnation of NREGA expenditure during the next 
few years. However, as expenditure began to rebound and increase in 2011, the number of 
female workers followed suit, increasing 12 percent from 2009-2010 to 2013-2014, while men 
continued to leave the program.   
 The percentage of female participants varies highly by state as well. Table 3 of the 
Appendix lists the states in order by the share of female participation in the NREGA between the 
years 2006-2014 while Figure 6 shows a map of female participation by state during the 
aforementioned years.150 The states that boast the highest rates include Kerala, Tamil Nadu, and 
Rajasthan with 85, 80, and 68 percent, respectively. Around 11 of the 34 states have failed to 
consistently meet the one-third mandate, however, with Jammu and Kashmir and Uttar Pradesh 
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producing the lowest numbers at 11 and 19 percent. The reasons as to why women’s 
participation varies so highly across states can be attributed to a number of different factors 
ranging from socio-economic norms, mobility, intra-household relationships, health, market 
wages between men and women, program efficiency, and social activism.151 For example, in 
Kerala, a feature that is unique to its implementation of the NREGA (and possibly the reason 
why it’s female participation rate is so high) is the fact that the state entrusted the line 
management and implementation to the Kudbashree – a state poverty eradication mission and 
program that has mobilized women into self-help groups for economic activity. This has allowed 
more women to supervise work sites and have a voice through the implementation process, 
perhaps making it easier for women to take up works within the state.152 
 Additionally, in many states, women’s participation in the NREGA has shown to be 
higher than their participation in the rural workforce prior to the implementation of the program. 
Figure 7 of the Appendix depicts this relationship, as 10 of the 15 countries observed showed 
higher rates of participation in the NREGA in 2008-2009 than in the rural work force in 2004-
2005. In 2009, at the height of the program, economists Chandrashekar and Jayati Ghosh noted 
that women were participating in the NREGA much more than in any other forms of recorded 
work, excluded unpaid work that does not show up in official Indian surveys.153 This shows that 
perhaps the “female friendly” aspects of the NREGA have helped to mobilize women into the 
workforce and alleviate some of the barriers seen in the labor market. In a study done in the state 
of Kerala, fieldwork indicated that many women were persuaded to come out of the house for 
paid work for the first time. One NREGA participant noted, 
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 I was a housewife till NREGS started. Ladies normally go for construction work locally 
 or else domestic work. As this work is provided close to the house, we normally go and 
 have food and then continue work. This is easier and we do not find it a burden. In the 
 initial days we used to get back pain and body pain as we were not used to such work but 
 now all are happy – no pain but gain as wages.154 
 
 Although women have taken up a larger share of these works, the overall labor force 
participation rate of women has not improved. In fact, female labor force participation rates have 
consistently dropped from the years 2004-2005 to 2010-2011. This occurrence is depicted in 
Figure 8 and Table 4 of the Appendix.155 If women have continued to increase their share of 
NREGA works, why has the workforce participation rate declined? Some of this decline in the 
rural labor force can be attributed to higher rates of women leaving to obtain an education and 
also poor ecological conditions that have made tending to agricultural duties difficult. 156 
However, there also seems to be societal barriers limiting female participation. 
 Ghosh considers several other possibilities and factors contributing to this decline. First is 
the increased burden of unpaid work. Ghosh found that there was a strong inverse relationship 
between work participation and involvement in domestic work (looking after children, taking 
care of the sick and the elderly, preparing food and other tasks associated with home 
management) and expenditure-saving activities (activities geared towards household 
consumption.)157 Further, societal norms may also be attributing to this decline. Many archaic 
beliefs about the work that women should be performing still persist in much of India. Once the 
works begin to rely too heavily on machinery, women are displaced with male workers.158 
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Therefore, women tend to perform the more arduous and taxing manual labor and are forced out 
as soon as tools such as tractors are introduced.  
 Additionally, the patriarchal system within India may also be a contributing factor to 
what is known as the “income effect.” This theory states that in times of economic poverty, 
women will enter to workforce to provide a supplemental income. In many households, once 
wages have increased and the family has recived enough income to move out of extreme poverty, 
women will effectively leave the workforce to attend to unpaid, household duties.159 This could 
possibly be due to women opting out of the workforce to tend to unpaid work, or the patriarchal 
norms of India where men tend to restrict their wives to working within the household. Figure 8 
of the Appendix supports this idea and displays the pattern of labor force participation rates from 
2004-2005 to 2011-2012. The graph depicts a decline in the labor force participation rate for 
rural women and throughout the country, while male participation rates across India and in rural 
area has remiained steady during this time period. As male wages have increased, families have 
placed less importance on the extra income earned by women and it is likely that they have been 
forced back into the home to attend to domestic work.  
 
2.3.2 Types of Works 
 Figure 10 of the Appendix also shows that in the aggregate, the program has had a 
somewhat even distribution of works. This is suggests that women have been given the 
opportunity to perform a variety of different projects. As discussed before, when implementing 
such a program, it is important to allow women to enter into a variety of different sectors in order 
to eliminate any chance of occupational segregation. Because women in India have taken over 
within the agricultural sector, it may be tempting to have women perform many of the tasks 
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relating to this type of work. Although there is little data on the works that women are 
specifically taking up, it can be said that because the average female share of the participation 
rate over this time period is around 47 percent, women were almost just as likely as men to 
perform labor intensive infrastructure projects as they were to perform agricultural works.    
 
2.3.3 Wages 
 The most important provision for women detailed within the NREGA is the mandate of 
equal wages for all workers. The wage rate is set at the minimum unskilled agricultural wage in 
each state. Table 2 of the Appendix details the difference in NREGA wages by gender for the 
three years that data was available. During the years 2007-2008 and 2009-2010, women received 
much higher wages when working under the NREGA than they would have performing any 
other type of work in rural areas. Their wages were greater by nearly 40 and 20 percent, 
respectively. In some states, this difference in wages was even greater. For example, in Madhya 
Pradesh, women would typically receive Rs. 30 a day, whereas the NREGA paid them Rs. 90 per 
day, a 67 percent difference.  
 As discussed, Table 2 shows the effect that NREGA wages has had on the pay received 
for other rural work. Between 2007-2008 and 2011-2012, the average daily wage for women 
increased by over 50 percent in private, casual work. Rural wages have actually increased faster 
than NREGA wages (23 percent for women), which increases with the minimum wage within 
each state. Because women were initially able to receive a higher wage under the NREGA, this 
increased their bargaining power and forced the private sector to increase the wage to a 
competitive level. By 2011-2012, the private sector wages for casual work surpassed the average 
NREGA wage, making it an effective base wage.  
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 This improved wage rate due to the NREGA has also helped to decrease the disparity of 
wages between male and female workers. This can be seen in Figure 9 of the Appendix. The 
graph depicts the rise in rural wages (left axis) as well as the change in female wages as a 
percentage of male wages in rural casual work (right axis.) The gender wage gap for casual work 
has decreased by around 5 percentage points since the 1999-2000 year. 
 However, these increases cannot be solely attributed to the NREGA. Counter-cyclical 
and environmental factors, such as agricultural returns, have also played a part in the rural wage 
growth. However, research has shown that the NREGA has played an important role in helping 
with the casual wage rate growth, especially for women. One study found that wages for female 
workers in NREGA areas grew 8.3 percent more than wages for women in non-NREGA districts 
during the studied years. This number was less than half for male workers, at 3.8 percent. This 
displays the important effects that the program has particularly had for women.  
 Although women in rural areas have seen an increase in their wages, there is still 
discrimination that occurs within the scheme. On average, women still generally receive wages 
well below the state wise minimum wage for the NREGA. Although the average wage rate 
across the country meant to take effect January 1, 2011 was around Rs. 123 per day160, Table 2 
shows women making much less than this. The table also shows that men tend to take home 
higher wages while working under the NREGA, although this gap is much smaller than the in the 
private sector. Because these rates are supposed to be tied to the minimum wage, it is difficult to 
say why women are receiving lower pay. One explanation is the lack of proper monitoring and 
auditing systems in many states, leading to gender discrimination. This will be discussed further 
in the following chapter.  
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 The increase in income for women has also shown to have a small impact on credit and 
loans. Some households have suggested that their participation in the NREGA has helped to gain 
access to loans, as well as help pay off existing ones. However, these findings are highly variable 
and depend on the existing financial status of the family.161 
 
2.3.4 Social Capital 
 Participation in the NREGA has also led to an increase of social capital for women. 
Holmes and Jones write, “Our research suggests that there is a general perception that social 
networks have strengthened, leading to improved relationships where men and women worked 
together and supporting informal access to borrowing small amounts of money from each 
other.”162 Kashualya Nair, a NREGA participant, noted the following after beginning work under 
the program, “The shopkeeper who used to ignore us now calls us and gives goods on credit and 
says pay when you get wages.”163 Because community members know that women and their 
families are receiving a reliable wage, they are more inclined to provide them with loans and 
credit. The strengthening of these relationships within their communities can allow women to 
perhaps gain greater independence and respect. 
 Relationships between men and women have also changed within the household, namely 
their role in the decision making process. In the National Family Health Survey III (2005-2006), 
only 29 percent of married women in rural areas made the decisions about the purchase of daily 
household needs, 26 percent made personal healthcare decisions, 7.6 percent made decisions on 
the purchase of major household items, and 10 percent made the decision to visit relatives.  By 
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2010, 71 percent of rural women reported retaining portions of their income to spend as they 
please, which included household items, healthcare, and visits to relatives.164 A participant from 
Jammu and Kashmir had the following experience:  
 There was once a time when women were not allowed to step out of the house and 
 women were not independent. Men had the responsibility of taking case of all the need of 
 women. Women were completely dependant on men. But now the times have changed 
 and women are working in MGNREGA, they are getting good rewards for their labour 
 and now the participation of women has increased more than men.165 
 
However, fieldwork done in Madhya Pradesh revealed that some households experienced a 
worsening effect, as tensions rose due to the disruption of household work and caring 
responsibilities. Many of the positive effects seen in this state were linked to women’s access to 
their income and their own bank accounts. In many cases, the roll out of bank accounts that are 
put under a woman’s name is dependent on the Panchayat. If more of an effort was given to 
increasing the amount of bank accounts opened in women’s names, this could further improve 
their stance and role in decision making within their homes.166   
 
2.3.2 Benefits for Women with Care Burdens 
 As wages under the NREGA and the amount of households taking part in the program 
has risen, this has had a certain impact on poverty. World Bank data shows that in the year 
before the NREGA was implemented, the percentage of the rural population living under the 
nation poverty line stood at 42 percent. That number has since decreased substantially to 26 
percent in 2012.167 This is especially important for women with care burdens, as they will be in a 
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better position to provide for those under their care. Much research has shown that the majority 
of income from the program gets spent on food. A survey from Andhra Pradesh shows that food 
expenditure increased by 15 percent post-implementation, while another survey done in 
Rajasthan showed that 56 percent spent wages on ‘food and basic needs.’168 
 Participation in the NREGA has also shown to have positive effects on the education of 
children. One study in particular looked at the relationship between the participation of women 
in the program and their children’s time in school in the state of Andhra Pradesh. The study 
found that greater participation of women in NREGA has had a positive effect on their children’s 
time in school. This is especially true for girls, the youngest children in the household, and 
children in the poorest wealth group. Further, the study found that a mother’s participation in the 
program also had a positive effect on the grade attainment of younger children, implying that 
more time in school translates into better educational attainment.169 This can perhaps be 
attributed to not only the increased income that allows women to pay school fees, but also the 
proximity of many of the works, allowing women more ease in transporting their children to 
school before and after work.  
 Besides food and education, women have also spent a good portion of their earnings on 
medical expenses, improving the health of those they care for. In a study done on the effect of 
participation in NREGA on children in Andrha Pradesh, the relationship between the program 
and child health outcomes was examined. The study looked at the change in height and weight 
for children when parents took up the works and found very strong, positive results. The paper 
also notes that it is not simply the registration in the program that as such an effect, but the actual 
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take up of a work that results in an income transfer that has shown to increase both height and 
weight of children.170  
 As discussed, the program has also shown to decrease migration throughout rural areas. 
This is especially important for working females who must also take on some sort of unpaid 
work burden. Because it is mandated for work to be locally available, this decreases the travel 
time that women must take on in order to find paid work. With the extra time provided due to 
decreased migration, this helps to decrease any additional unpaid work time that many women 
face and diminishes the chance of a “double day” effect.   
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 The NREGA has succeeded in formulating several gendered dimensions from explicit 
quotas, wage equality, and requiring appropriate facilities and care assistance to mothers. Many 
of these policies have come to fruition, as women have taken up well over the mandated one-
third of works and the higher income has given them the capabilities to emerge from poverty and 
provide for those that they care for. The right to work along with gender-sensitive policies has 
led to many positive effects for rural women and the alleviation of certain labor force 
discriminations.  However, certain inadequacies and implementation failures have arisen within 
the program. I have touched on a few in this portion of my research, but in the next section I will 
lay out the systemic erosion of the NREGA that has taken place within the last few years.  
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Chapter 3: NREGA under Attack 
 When the NREGA was enacted in 2006, it became the largest jobs guarantee program in 
the world. Its objective is the alleviation of poverty and the enhancement of life to all rural 
people willing and able to work. As discussed, although it has succeeded in many areas, the 
program has also fallen short in others. A relatively new scheme with such a large size and 
scope, it was inevitable that administrative and implementation challenges would occur. Many of 
these that have been seen throughout the country include lack of provisions for women at 
worksites, failure to provide demanded work, wage payment issues, poor monitoring and 
auditing mechanisms, and corruption. Further, these issues within the program have only been 
exacerbated with a declining logistical and financial support from the Central Government.   
 
3.1 Failure by Design 
 One implementation issue that has especially affected women within the program is the 
failed attempt at providing crèches at worksites. Many have reportedly criticized the program for 
not making sure such provisions were available to women at NREGA sites. Figure 11 of the 
Appendix depicts the status of facilities at thirteen surveyed worksites in the states of Bihar, 
Jharkhand, Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh. Only 1 of the survey worksites provided a crèche. 
The study showed that only 28 percent of women felt comfortable bringing their children to 
work with them. Further, a majority of the mothers confessed to feeling emotionally strained 
because they were worried about their children.171 In another study, some women were forced to 
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leave their younger children with older daughters, meaning they were pulled from school to tend 
to their younger siblings.172 
 In the most recent Comptroller and Attorney General (CAG) audit on the NREGA, which 
covers the years 2007-2012, there are several implementation issues discussed. During the years 
analyzed, 14 of the 34 participating states only completed 30 percent of the planned works, 
amounting to Rs. 99,168.87 million of unused funds. Further, job cards in six states were not 
issued to a total of 12,455 households. Where some states were failing to implement work, other 
states were performing inadmissible works. In the 25 districts that were checked, 102,100 
unauthorized works were taken up. This amounts to an expenditure of Rs. 2,252.43 million. 
Some of these works performed included construction of earthen roads, cement concrete roads, 
construction of raised platforms for cattle and other animals, and construction of bathing ghats 
(steps leading to a body of water to allow for bathing).173 Although these works may bring 
benefit to their communities, there is a highly bureaucratic system within the NREGA in which 
all works must accord with the strict provisions of the act and be approved by the Central 
Government.  
 There have also been significant issues with the payment systems. The social audit 
discussed above recorded nonpayment/under payment of wages in fourteen states amounting to 
Rs. 36.97 million. There were also several cases in which no compensation was paid for a delay 
of wages.174 Most recently, a report showed that 70 percent of wages had not been paid on time 
under the NREGA so far this financial year (2014-2015). As of December 2014, only 28.22 
percent of wage payments had been made within the stipulated 15 days. Of the 72 percent of 
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delayed payments, almost 9 percent were paid after 90 days.175  Further, the piece-rate system of 
pay that some states have implemented, which pays a worker for output rather than time and is 
determined by a Schedule of Rates (SOR), has shown to be lower than the statutory minimum 
wage. This is due to the fact that many SORs and expectations of the site engineers were found 
to be so stringent that they prevented most workers from receiving the full wage for a day’s 
work.176  
 Many of these implementation issues have been caused by a few factors, first of which 
being the inadequate implementation of social auditing and accountability mechanisms. The 
CAG social audit reported that in ten states, governments had not constituted Social Audit Units 
to facilitate the social audit forums. In eleven states, it was observed that significantly fewer 
social audits from prescribed norms were conducted.177 If audits were conducted, however, there 
were often no records made of the event and proper repercussions were not made to deal with 
complaints and grievances. Further, vigilance committees were rare in places where NGOs were 
not active.178  
 If much more attention were put into these governing mechanisms, this could really help 
to improve the effectiveness and implementation of the NREGA and aid in much of the 
corruption that has been rampant throughout the program. There are several empirical studies 
that show very wide gaps between the program’s guidelines and actual implementation. This 
includes inadequate supervision at worksites, leakages that represent corruption, and fake muster 
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rolls that are used for embezzlement of funds.179 Although private contractors are banned under 
the act, they still have control of works in many areas. Reports have shown that they perpetuate 
corrupt practices such as the “percentage system,” in which government officials get a share of 
the profit through prefixed percentages.180 There have, however, been attempts at quelling such 
corruption within the program. Most recently, the state of Madhya Pradesh introduced an e-
attendance system where workers would have to record their work at sites electronically, 
increasing transparency and eliminating the chance of the creation of fraudulent muster rolls.181  
 Other than implementation oversights, the most current failures of the program can be 
attributed to a shift in how the government views the program and also the recent regime change 
in the governing body of India. When the program came to be in 2006, it was put in place by a 
government dedicated to providing social stability for the poorest of India. The NREGA was 
their flagship program. However, as corruption ran its course and issues within the program 
increased, an ideological shift occurred. Further, the 2014 election put into power a pro-business 
and investment government with a disdain for the social policies that had been enacted under the 
former powers. A governing body that has little support for the program has further aided in the 
systemic erosion of the NREGA.  
 
3.2 Regime Change  
 The Indian elections of 2004 came down to two opposing parties: the Hindu nationalist 
and center-right party of Bharatiya Janata (BJP) and the India National Congress party, led by 
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Sonia Gandhi. Although the Congress party had governed for 45 of the 57 years since Indian 
independence, it had been written off as almost a historical relic because of poor performances in 
most recent years.182 The BJP party had been favored to win, but in a turn of events, the 
Congress party was victorious at the polls. Shortly after the victory, the new left-leaning United 
Progressive Alliance (UPA) coalition government came into power. The Congress nominated 
their party lieutenant, Oxford-educated economist Manmohan Singh, as Prime Minister and 
Sonia Gandhi became the government’s Chairperson.183  
 The UPA put much of their efforts towards legislation relating to social and economic 
rights. During its two terms in power, the UPA enacted the Right to Information Act of 2005, the 
Forest Rights Act of 2006, the National Food Security Bill (NFSB) and the NREGA in 2006. It 
is especially interesting that the government would take up such social projects, as recent growth 
in India’s economy had been accompanied by rising economic and social inequalities. 
Additionally, the pro-business environment in the country had warded off government 
intervention in the recent years. In the case of the NREGA, much of the demand for a right to 
work program had grown out of influential grassroots organizations, especially out of the 
Rajasthan region.184 This depicts the demand for government intervention that was arising within 
the country at this time. 
 However, by the end of his second term in office, Prime Minister Singh and the Congress 
party had lost steam with the voters, and the BJP won in the 2014 general election. Narendra 
Modi, the former chief minister of the state of Gujarat, effectively became the new Prime 
Minister of India and the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) coalition government was 
                                                
182 Amy Aldman. “In Huge Upset. Gandhi’s Party Wins Election in India.” The New York Times. May 
13, 2004. http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/13/international/asia/13CND-INDI.html. 
183 K. Alan Kronstadt. “India’s 2004 National Elections.” CRS Report for Congress. July 12, 2004.  
184 Reetika Khera. “Democratic Politics and Legal Rights: Employment guarantee and food security in 
India.” Institute of Economic Growth. 2013. 15. 
  
63 
formed. It was during his time as chief minister of Gujarat that Modi displayed his affinity for 
pro-growth and investment policies. Many of the investor-friendly policies implemented under 
Modi’s administration have helped Gujarat become a destination for automakers such as Ford 
Motor Company. In an interview in 2012, Modi said that he was beginning to focus his energy 
into bringing defense manufacturing to the state.185 The large economic growth that has been 
seen within Gujarat can be attributed to such policies. 
 However, as seen in Chapter 1, pro-investment and growth policies are often not 
conducive to pulling people out of poverty. As Minsky stated, “…contracts granted to 
sophisticated, high-tech industries generate demand for skilled, high wage labor, thereby 
exacerbating income inequality within the labor force.”186 This has definitely been displayed 
through the economic policies of Gujarat under Modi. Although the state has seen much 
expansion under Modi’s rule, the state has also witnessed high inequality. In the state’s largest 
city, Ahmedabad, one can see the poor taking shelter on sidewalks and ritzy shopping malls all in 
one shot. Additionally, in 2006, almost half of children under six living in Gujarat were stunted 
or too short for their age. In an interview, Modi attributed the malnutrition in his state partially to 
vegetarian diets and also to the body image issues among young women. He stated, “The middle 
class is more beauty-conscious than health-conscious—that is a challenge," he said. "If a mother 
tells her daughter to have milk, they'll have a fight—she'll tell her mother, 'I won't drink milk. I'll 
get fat.”187 As for the way in which the government was being run under the Congress party, 
Modi stated, “Government has no business to be in business.”188 
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 In the 2014 general election, Modi ran on a platform of anti-corruption and pro-growth, 
which appealed to many Indian voters who had seen the way in which corruption plagued the 
NREGA. He promised jobs to those who wanted a ‘hand up’ rather than a traditional hand out.189 
Some argue that his success in the general election can also be attributed to the 
“Americanization” of the BJP’s campaign. This refers to the glamour that is often associated 
with American politicians, rather than focusing on actual policies. The BJP employed many of 
these types of tactics for the election, such as hiring international PR companies and employing 
target advertising over social media. In addition, they courted big corporate houses for campaign 
donations.190 The inexperienced Congress candidate, Rahul Gandhi, did not stand much of a 
chance against such a force.  
 As a government uninterested in providing its people with what they deem as “hand 
outs,” the NDA has been less than thrilled with the NREGA and other social safety net programs. 
Since its takeover in 2014, the Modi government has repeatedly discussed reforming and scaling 
back the NREGA scheme. Some of the reforms that have been raised are large budget cuts, the 
restriction of the program to the 200 poorest districts (instead of the 625 it currently serves), and 
changing the wage to material ratio from 60:40 to an even 50:50, to help with the production of 
durable assets. Because the government is so pro-business, it is intuitive to believe that they 
would not wholeheartedly support a program that takes workers away from the private sector and 
gives them higher bargaining power. From spending cuts and not releasing the proper funds 
needed to finance wages, the NDA government has consistently proven their lack of support for 
the program.  
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3.2.1 Fund Cuts 
 Although the Modi government denies squeezing funds to the NREGA and states that it 
merely wishes to reform the program, there have been reports of significant reductions in funds 
allocated to the program since their election. Compared to the 2013-2014 financial year, there 
has been a 45 percent reduction in funds released by the Central government as of September 
2014. This is reportedly the sharpest reduction in funds since the scheme’s inception. To 
compare, the Centre had released Rs. 13,618 million to states as of September 2014, whereas Rs. 
24,676 million had been released in the same period for the preceding year. 191  Figure 12 of the 
Appendix depicts the percentage change in funding from the last financial year by state, the data 
includes up to December 19, 2014. The graph shows all but five states receiving lower funding 
than the preceding year.192  
 Although the cuts to funding has intensified with the regime changing over to a much 
more conservative government, Jayati Ghosh writes that this ‘cynical’ process began under to 
UPA government in 2010. This was done by putting a cap on the allocated funds to each state. 
Because the program is meant to be demand-driven, putting a cap on the allocated funds 
essentially takes the air out of the right to work. If the government wished to restrict funding for 
their EGP, the way to do so would be through a cap on wages, rather than a cap on spending. 
Further, Ghosh writes that the budget allocation for the scheme is only about half of the Ministry 
of Rural Development’s estimates of the “approved person days as per the labour budget.”193 The 
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lack of funding has led to a number of administrative failures, including problems with wage 
payment and providing NREGA employment.   
 As mentioned, the scheme has seen large delays and non-payment of wages, especially 
within the last financial year. Many states attribute the lack of payments to this withholding of 
funds by the Central government.  For example, in Kashmir’s district of Baramulla, there has 
been strong resentment against their state government for delayed wages. One resident noted, 
“Our families are starving. We demand immediate release of pending salaries. If government 
doesn’t release our salaries we would not hesitate to come on the roads.”194 When asked about 
the delays a state official responded, “Due to lack of funds in the NREGA, the release of the 
salaries has got delayed. I have already sent a proposal to higher authorities to release funds.”195 
Instances such as these have occurred all across participating Indian states. Under the 
“Guidelines on compensation for delayed wages payments,” the Program Officer (PO) decides 
within 15 days of the delay payment whether or not the compensation is payable. The PO can 
reject the compensation on three grounds: compensation is not due, natural calamities, or funds 
are not available.196 Out of all of the rejected delayed compensations that have occurred thus far 
in 2014-2015, 82 percent were reportedly rejected because of ‘insufficient funds.’197 
 The lack of government funding has also hindered the states’ abilities to generate enough 
work for those who demand it. Data indicates that just a little over one third of the mandated 100 
days so far this financial year have been provided to households. As of January 31, 2014, the 
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average days of employment provided to households had been 34.84. This number was 46 for 
last financial year. Ministry officials have attempted to attribute this phenomenon to the fact that 
there is less demand for the scheme, and therefore less days being worked. However, many 
others have agreed that the lack of employment generation has been mainly a supply-side effect, 
occurring from faulty implementation and insufficient funding.198 
 Although there had been much speculation leading up to the unveiling of the NDA’s 
2015-2016 budget that the NREGA budget would be slashed, Finance Minister Arun Jaitley gave 
the program a 12 percent increase in budget allocation with Rs. 34,699 million. This is the 
highest allocation the program has received since its inception. Although the program’s budget 
has been increased, the budget slashed many other social protection programs and has been 
labeled as “anti-poor, anti-farmer, and anti-growth.” Some sectors that endured cuts in order to 
decrease India’s fiscal deficit include agriculture, drinking water and sanitation, and water 
resources. Many of the beneficiaries of the NREGA rely on these programs, and some are used 
in conjunction with the program. Most notably, the Ministry of Women and Child Development 
has teamed up with the NREGA to have women help build schools for children and community 
centers. The budget for this ministry was slashed by nearly 50 percent for the current budget.199 
 Further, although NREGA’s budget was not cut, there still seems to be little support for 
the program from the Central Government. In a statement after the unveiling of the Budget, 
Prime Minister Modi explained why he did not attempt to discontinue the program, “You will 
have to agree that I have good political sense. I cannot do away with the MGNREGA, as it is a 
                                                
198 Ruhl Tewari. “NREGA set to hit new low in targets.” Indian Express. February 1, 2015. 
http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/nrega-set-to-hit-new-low-in-targets/. 
199 Abantika Ghosh. “Activists cry foul as WCD Ministry funds slash by half.” Indian Express. March 1, 
2015. http://indianexpress.com/article/business/budget/activists-cry-foul-as-wcd-ministry-funds-slashed-
by-half/. 
  
68 
living reminder of your mistakes,” in reference to the UPA government.200 The disdain Modi has 
for the NREGA is quite apparent. Therefore, it is hard to say whether or not the government will 
support the program the way it needs to and release the funds accordingly. With such a lack of 
enthusiasm, India may see yet another year of back logged wages and insufficient releasing of 
funding by the Centre.  
 
3.2.2 Shift to Infrastructure  
 Although it seems quite clear that the current Indian government is pushing for greater 
infrastructure and growth within the country, it was the UPA that began the program’s shift to an 
emphasis on construction and infrastructure. In 2013, the rural development minister, Jairam 
Ramesh, promised to adjust their focus to creating more durable assets under the NREGA. In 
order to do so, he allowed states to be more flexible when abiding by the wage to labor ratio of 
60:40, which would allow for greater expenditure for materials that will lead to asset creation.201 
The current government also greatly supports a move to more construction-based works. 
Although they did not follow through with this idea in their 2015-2016 Budget, the 
administration had been seriously considering altering the labor material ratio to an even 50:50, 
in order to lend more funds for materials and thus, the creation of more durable assets.  
 The Economic Survey released for 2014 also urged that the NREGA should change into a 
“development oriented programme creating tangible and meaningful assets and infrastructure…” 
In an attempt to explain why these assets were not being produced, the survey pointed out that in 
certain areas, women were more likely to take up works under the program because the private 
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sector wages for males was much larger. According to the report, because women were the main 
workers in these areas, this led to only small works of lesser utility being undertaken rather than 
larger, more tangible projects. The survey stated, “The need for community projects is becoming 
less important as probably such works have already been completed or are on the brink of 
saturation or on account of lack of common interest in public works.”202 
 Figures 13 and 14 of the Appendix depict this shift in the types of works being taken up 
under the program.203 In the 2011-2012 financial year, the works with the highest concentration 
of participation seemed to be water conservation. Under the NREGA manual, water conservation 
and harvesting works typically include construction of dams, contour trenches and check dams. 
Theses works involve manual digging activity and are classified as non-durable assets in the long 
run. However, this has shifted greatly during the last year, with rural sanitation being taken up by 
a 31 percent of participants. Rural sanitation acts were deemed permissible under the NREGA 
with an amendment in 2013. These works include the creation of private lavatory areas to help 
with the nearly 620 million people practicing open defecation within India.204 Although these 
new works may provide a necessary asset for the community, they were not put in place with the 
female perspective in mind. 
 
3.3 Conclusion 
 Although the NREGA has not lived up to its potential and has run into a number 
hindrances and complications, many still support the program and reject the attempts of the 
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current government to restrict it. When reports began to come out that the NDA government was 
planning on scaling back the program, people from all across the country came to protest the 
government’s actions. The Trinamool Congress – a left of center political party – was a main 
actor in organizing such protests. When word came of the programs’ grim fate, the party 
organized a demonstration outside of the Parliament in which they carried earthen pots, to 
represent and protest against the dilution of the job scheme. Further, in October of 2014, twenty-
eight leading economists penned a letter to Prime Minister Modi urging him to not squeeze 
NREGA funds. They wrote, “The message seems to be that the new government is not 
committed to the NREGA and hopes to restrict it as much as possible. We urge you to reverse 
this trend and ensure that the programme receives all the support it requires to survive and 
thrive.”205 Many who have lived and witnessed the program’s benefits do not condone 
government’s current actions and believe a dismantling of the program may only augment 
poverty and its repercussions. In the next chapter, I will attempt to show what possible adverse 
effects such scaling back efforts may have on the group that has seemingly benefited the most 
from the NREGA. 
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Chapter 4: Counterfactual Analysis: Possible Effects on Women 
 This project has laid out the multitude of positive effects the NREGA has created for 
women in rural areas. Although the program has seen faulty implementation and back to back 
governments that are less than supportive of its objective, the NREGA has nonetheless helped 
pull women out of poverty, improved the health and education of their children, and increased 
their standing within their communities and households. However, if there continues to be a 
systemic erosion of the largest EGP the world has ever seen, how could this affect the progress 
the scheme has made for women within India’s heavily patriarchal system? In this chapter, I will 
be analyzing the impacts the program has made for women, and how the continued dilution of 
India’s largest social safety net may halt such progress.  
 
4.1 Fund Reduction  
 As previously stated, states under the NREGA have been receiving ‘capped’ and limited 
funds for the program for the last five years of its implementation. Although the Modi 
government has promised to allocate more funds to the NREGA in the upcoming financial year, 
it is possible that such an unsupportive government will be even less inclined to release the funds 
that are needed for smooth execution of the scheme. Further, if the program does not perform up 
to the standards of the sitting government, future budgetary cuts to the program are likely. This 
attrition of the NREGA funding is likely to have a ripple effect throughout the scheme, causing a 
host of problems for female beneficiaries. I hypothesize that such cuts will have strong impacts 
on rural wages, including the wage gap, female workforce participation, and an increase in the 
unpaid work burden for women.  
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4.1.1 Wages 
 Although wage disparities continue to persist under the NREGA, the scheme has shown 
to help significantly with the increase of wages all across rural India, especially for female 
workers. As discussed, because workers are able to receive the statutory minimum wage under 
the program, this has stabilized the wage floor and allowed for less precarious wage rates. 
However, as the program has continued to face obstacles, the growth in rural wages has also 
slowed. It was recently reported that the wages of those in rural India are not rising at the same 
rate that they did under the UPA government. From November 2013 to November 2014, the 
wage rate for rural India only grew by 3.8 percent. This is reportedly the lowest growth since 
2005.206 
 An economist at the India Institute of Technology Delhi, who has studied the impact of 
the NREGA on rural India, reported that the recent spending cuts to the scheme is certainly a 
plausible explanation as to why there has been a drop in rural wage growth.207 Because people 
are not seeing their wages and works are becoming less and less available, the bargaining power 
that workers had obtained due to the NREGA has likely lost its power. Workers, therefore, are 
forced to take lower wages because the alternative is to have delayed or no income at all. 
Although a number of factors could be contributing to the stagnation in rural wages, it is likely 
that the scale back of the program has not helped. Because women already tend to face 
discrimination within the private sector, this erosion of their bargaining power is not likely to 
improve the stance of their rural wages. It is plausible to believe that this will cause even further 
stagnation in female wages.  
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 Further, as discussed in Chapter 2, the NREGA has been shown to have a stronger impact 
on female wages than the male pay rate. Therefore, the erosion of the program is also likely to 
impact women more so than their male counterparts. As female wages begin to drop faster than 
male’s, this will perhaps cause a return to a larger wage gap that was observed before the 
implementation of the program.  
 
4.1.2 Female Workforce Participation 
 As shown, the last few years have displayed a large reduction in the amount of works 
being taken up under the NREGA as well as delayed or non-payments of wages. Although the 
government asserts that the lack of works is due to a slowing of demand, many have analyzed 
that this is instead a supply-side phenomenon arising partially from a lack of funding. Because 
fewer working days are being provided under the scheme and people are going months without 
payment, the program is looking less and less attractive to all participants, including women. The 
total number of female participants has dropped by nearly 30 percent from the 2013-2014 
financial year to the 2014-2015 year, the largest drop in female participation in the program to 
date.208  
 Because there has not been a large survey done in India on labor force participation rates 
since 2011-2012, it is difficult to say how the erosion has impacted these rates during the last few 
years. However, if women are leaving the NREGA, there are two alternatives that they must 
face: finding wage-work within the private sector, or returning to the home to perform unpaid 
work duties. My hypothesis is that the latter will occur initially, with women moving into the 
private sector in the coming years.  
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 As we have seen, women tend to face even greater inequalities within private sector 
work. This includes high occupational segregation, large wage discrepancies, and barriers to 
entry into the workforce. Additionally, with the scaling back of the program, this could 
potentially cause the wage gap to increase, as discussed. This may be an unattractive alternative 
for women leaving the NREGA. Further, the income effect discussed in Chapter 2, which states 
that women tend to leave the workforce during times of economic prosperity, may also hinder 
women from entering into the private sector. Because the NREGA has helped to pull up the rural 
wage floor for not only women, but also male workers, this may cause more women leaving the 
NREGA to return to the household, effectively decreasing the female workforce participation 
rate. Such a phenomenon is show in Figure 15 of the Appendix, which shows the results of a 
study that predicted the probability of the female labor force participation rate by mean male 
household wages. As male wages increase, there is a clear decline in the probability of females 
joining the workforce. Figure 8 also supports this idea, as the female labor force declined by 
more than 5 percentage points during the first six years of the program as wages rose for all 
workers. My belief is that this will occur within the first year or two of the program’s demise, but 
the climate will shift in the coming years. 
 As the erosion of the program continues, this will reverse any progress the rural economy 
has made in regard to the wage floor.  If you remove this floor that the NREGA has provided, 
whatever stability was there is now gone. This will make not only female wages precarious, but 
also their male counterparts’. In accordance with the income effect, this will cause women to 
leave their home in search of paid employment. The labor force participation rate will, therefore, 
increase. However, because women face less than ideal circumstances within the private labor 
market, the jobs may not be there and if they are, they may be employed into unsettling 
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situations. Especially without the same bargaining power they once held because of the NREGA, 
finding secure work within the private sector may not be easy for women wishing to perform 
paid employment to help support their families.   
 The high rate of female beneficiaries during the first half of the NREGA was shown to 
alleviate many of the discriminations women faced on a daily basis. As discussed, receiving their 
own income has empowered women to make more choices within their household and in certain 
situations, eased any tensions that had once been felt with their significant other. Further, women 
have also seen an increase in their social capital and relations in their communities, allowing for 
greater access to credit and loans. However, as women begin to return to the household or look 
within the private sector for work, this may lead to a setback in any of the progress that has been 
made for female empowerment. Because they would no longer be bringing in their own income 
or much smaller rewards, women might have less say on how to allocate the family’s funds, and 
if a community member sees that they are no longer working, they may be less inclined to 
provide them with any monetary favors.  
 
4.1.3 Social Auditing and Monitoring 
 As spelled out in the Operational Guidelines of the NREGA, the purpose of the social 
auditing and monitoring mechanisms is to ensure public accountability in the implementation of 
projects, laws and policies. However, as discussed earlier, many states have failed to keep up 
with such transparency regulations. This has led to corruption, faulty implementation, and 
discrimination. The NREGA has put in several different provisions to ensure that female voices 
and concerns are heard. However, if audits and committee meetings are not being held or 
reported, these concerns cannot be heard and the inefficiencies that have plagued the program 
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will continue. Further, if states continue to receive less than adequate funding, it is unlikely that 
states will look to improve such mechanisms. Therefore, the female voice will continue to go 
unheard in the monitoring process.  
 
4.1.4 Women with Care Burdens 
 As discussed, the NREGA hoped to implement several policies under the act to help 
women with the burden of childcare and household work. This includes mandating that works be 
provided close to home and that child-care services, known as crèches, be made available at each 
worksite. However, as reported earlier, many worksites consistently fail to provide these types of 
accommodations for mothers. As Ghosh hypothesized, because the burden of unpaid work has 
increased for many rural women, it could be a contributing factor to their exit from the labor 
force all together. If funds continue to be squeezed from the program, it is doubtful that states 
will be able to provide any sort of accommodation for mothers at worksites and they will 
continue to leave the program and perhaps the labor force all together.  
 In fact, in the most recently proposed budget by the NDA government, there were 
significant cuts to the budget for the Ministry of Women and Child Development. In 2012, the 
NREGA converged with this ministry to begin working on the construction of what is known as 
angnawadis, which are used as community centers. By combining these two funds, it was 
proposed that the two departments would construct 1,500 centers over the course of four to five 
years. These particular centers would be used to house meetings for women self-help groups, as 
well as providing crèches to women working under the NREGA.209 However, with a nearly 50 
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percent cut to their budget allocation, this project, that could potentially help make significant 
strides in reducing the unpaid work burden, may never come to full fruition.  
 As the erosion of the NREGA continues to force women out of the program and into a 
labor market where it is difficult to find stable employment, this could have significant impact on 
child development in rural areas. As discussed, since the implementation of the NREGA, poverty 
has been reduced throughout the country. With extra income, women have been able to spend 
more money on food, health-care, and education. As shown, multiple studies have depicted the 
positive relationship that female participation in the NREGA has had on both child educational 
attainment and nutrition. However, with female participation on a downward slope, this could 
possibly reverse progressions in these areas.  
 
4.2 Increased Importance of Infrastructure 
 Since 2013, the Indian government has encouraged states under the NREGA to begin 
work that will provide the country with long-lasting, durable assets. Because of this, the types of 
works being taken up under the scheme have seen a drastic change in their make up. Whereas 
many of the years leading up the present financial year saw a relatively even distribution of 
projects being performed, the current 2014-2015 year has witnessed a large shift to 
infrastructure-heavy works. Although this could lead to the creation of beneficial community 
assets, the shift to these types of projects was not done with a gender perspective. A move into 
these more exclusively construction and infrastructure jobs could have potentially negative 
impacts on women wishing to take part in the scheme. In this section, I will argue that this 
ideological shift will only augment the discrimination and barriers into the labor market that 
women face as well as increase the burden of unpaid work for mothers and care takers.   
  
78 
4.2.1 Constructing Barriers 
 After less than two years with an infrastructure-heavy doctrine, the dispersion of works 
being taken up has already shifted.  As I discussed in the first chapter, it is very important for 
EGPs to provide a variety of works and not create any occupational segregation in which women 
are taking on smaller, less labor-intensive jobs. Rather, women should be able to take up a 
variety of jobs, which could help female workers gain new skills that they may have otherwise 
not acquired in the private sector due to biases. This can help to break down any gender 
stereotypes.  
 Although when discussing the gendered impacts of the program, I noted that women have 
had access to an assortment of different projects, certain discriminations still exist. When looking 
at the reasons for the falling female labor force participation rate in India, Ghosh noted that 
women are often forced out of heavily construction-based jobs.210 Although they are trusted with 
a lot of the harsh, manual labor, male workers are often brought in to work any heavy machinery 
needed for the job. Therefore, women may be forced out of such projects and employment 
opportunities. If the government continues to place such a large importance on infrastructure, 
these types of sentiments towards women’s work could persist, and barriers to these positions 
could occur. Of course, one could argue the opposite: that because the program mandates that a 
third of beneficiaries be women, this could allow women to break into sectors and gain new 
skills that they otherwise could not. However, until monitoring and auditing mechanisms are 
improved, it will be difficult to spot discrimination occurring under the scheme and women will 
be unable to communicate any issues they face. Also, with women already leaving the program, 
this may be an indication that these types of occupational segregation are already occurring on a 
national scale.  
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4.2.2 Women with Care Burdens 
 A major critique by economists on the gendered aspect of the program has been the lack 
of social sector jobs provided under the act. As mentioned in Chapter 1, EGPs are often 
implemented with the objective of creating productive assets to communities. However, under 
the NREGA, this often takes the form of infrastructure-heavy work including construction of 
dams and roads. Although I argued in Chapter 2 that some of these more exceedingly laborious 
works can help with the burden of unpaid work, especially works that improve the process of 
collecting water for the household, they should also be implemented in conjunction with social 
sector works. If a greater number of social sector jobs were offered under the scheme, such as 
teaching, child-care, and nursing, this could help to ease the female care burden.  
 However, as the proposal and implementation of works directed more towards the 
creation of durable assets occurs under the program, it is unlikely that such measures will be 
taken. Additionally, any current works or policies that have been put into place to help with 
unpaid work have already been slashed. For example, as shown in Figures 13 and 14, works 
taken up under “water conservation” have significantly decreased from 2011-2012 to the present 
year. Because these works do not create durable assets, according to the Central Government, 
many of these jobs have been cut. In fact, the amount of works being taken up under water 
conservation has decreased by 56 percent from January 2014 to January 2015.211 However, these 
jobs are some of the few that can actually help with the collection of drinking water. For 
example, the implementation of check dams is a major work under this classification. These 
dams help to improve the quality of groundwater and make it suitable for drinking. Therefore, 
this reduces the allocated time women take to make sure that their water is suitable for 
consumption.   
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 Even some of the few social sector positions have felt the changing perspective of the 
governing body. For example, in the Alappuzha district of Kerala, the NREGA has made a huge 
impact on the health sector within the district and helped them to remain free from major 
diseases. However, a joint program coordinator of the NREGA in the district reported this past 
December that the government was directing them to provide works that can create productive 
assets. He noted that hundreds of engineers and other clerical jobs would need to be cut from the 
program. He stated, “Following this, many workers stopped their work under the MGNREGA 
programme. Now we have only 46,753 workers while earlier we had over 94,341 workers.”212 If 
these reforms to the program persist, the unpaid work burden will continue to rise, either creating 
a “double day” effect for women, or forcing them out of the labor market completely.  
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Conclusion and Policy Implications 
 The discussion throughout this project has shown the far-reaching impacts of the NREGA 
despite facing many obstacles throughout its implementation. What has been argued here is that 
the complete dismantling or scaling back of the program can have real adverse effects for female 
workers including the return to an unfavorable labor market, increased wage gap, and an increase 
in the burden of unpaid work. As 28 leading Indian economists wrote in their letter to the Central 
Government, “No doubt, the programme could and should do even better. But the gains that have 
been achieved are substantial and amply justify further efforts to make it (NREGA) a 
success.”213 Therefore, the next question that must be asked is what efforts must be made in 
order to make the program a success? Further, what can be done to not only make the program 
successful, but what can also be done in order to continue benefiting and improving the stance of 
female workers?  
 One option would be for the government to attempt to reverse any of the damage that has 
been done to the program. If the government were to increase and release the necessary funds in 
order for the program to function properly, this could potentially help to quell many of the issues 
that have plagued the NREGA. As mentioned previously, the improper releasing of funding has 
caused a ripple effect of inadequacies including lack of employment, unpaid wages, and failed 
implementation of proper monitoring systems, which has exacerbated corruption within the 
program. Proper support from the Central Government could help to correct the functionality and 
success of the scheme. Other than releasing appropriate funding, program officials should also 
place a greater importance on providing works to help with the burden of unpaid work. As 
discussed, there has been a shift away from many projects that have helped to mitigate the 
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burden of unpaid work for women, such as water conservation works and social sector positions. 
A return and even increased importance of these types of works can help to not only improve the 
success of the program, but also continue to have positive impacts on female workers.  
 However, it may be the case that the damage has already been done and the scheme is 
beyond repair. Should the program be replaced with other poverty solutions? Some may wish to 
change the program over to a more traditional form of welfare, and provide those who would 
have fallen under the NREGA with cash transfers instead of work. This is probably an especially 
popular sentiment for those in Modi’s government, considering NREGA works could potentially 
take business away from larger, private firms. However, many argue that EGPs have greater 
advantages over income guarantee programs. As discussed, an ELR scheme can have important 
macroeconomic effects including price stability and cost-effectiveness. A comparison of such a 
program to an income guarantee finds that EGPs are a much more powerful stabilizer of the 
business cycle, enhance price stability by counter balancing inflationary pressures, and provide 
an important anchor for the value of the currency that cannot be offered by a cash transfer 
system.214  
 Further, research has shown that women who have taken up work under EGPs have 
preferred gaining work experience to merely being provided with a cash transfer. In a study done 
in Argentina on the evolution of its EGP, Plan Jefes, to a cash transfer program, Plan Familias, 
it was found that women overwhelmingly wanted paid work opportunities over the new 
system.215 Although there is no study that has analyzed what this perception is for women 
working under the NREGA, I believe that it is reasonable to hypothesize that they would have 
similar sentiments to Jefes participants. In fact, each program has had similar effects on women 
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as women from both countries felt a greater sense of empowerment in both their households and 
communities due to participation in the program. The women surveyed from Argentina knew 
that income alone does not empower, but it is rather the sense that they are doing something 
good for their communities and earning a living for themselves and their families. However, one 
cannot know for certain at this time whether or not a guaranteed income program would be a 
viable alternative in rural India. This perhaps calls for further research into this subject. 
 I currently, however, remain unconvinced that changing to a system of cash transfers 
would be the best way to reform the NREGA, especially keeping women in mind. A component 
that guarantees a right to work for all is still necessary in order to empower women and decrease 
unpaid work responsibilities. What may be most conducive to perpetuating this right and 
maintaining positive effects for women would be to give greater power to communities and 
social enterprises in creating and providing works. Arturo Escobar, an anthropology professor at 
the University of North Carolina, discusses the importance of social movements to bringing 
about change. He quotes the following: 
 If we study the meaning of political practices in daily life, the construction of identities 
 and discourses, we do not do it assuming that these are determinant - or necessary - of 
 practices at the institutional level. Neither do we assume the autonomy of democracy on 
 the political plane in relation to people's everyday practices. The relationships between 
 one and the other level are complex and mediated. Our intention is to point to a field of 
 construction of democracy that, in the first place, is important in itself: the social relations 
 of daily life (as Chilean feminists say: democracy in the home and democracy in the 
 State).216 
 
What this states is that it is difficult for institutions to formulate policies that are specific to the 
needs of every household and community, especially in a vast country such as India that contains 
many different households with many different needs. This is why Escobar and others place a 
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great importance on local, social movements in order to implement and carry out change, or 
poverty alleviation in this case. 
 As discussed, it was grassroots organizations that held a lot of influence in organizing the 
demand for a right to work program in India. Further, in many states where the program has seen 
success and also high rates of female participation, local organizations have played a major role 
in the implementation and carrying out of the NREGA. In the state of Rajasthan, which boasts a 
female share of 68 percent, a number of active civil society groups have engaged with the 
program since the design stage.217 As shown before, many self-help groups have also aided in the 
carrying out of the program in the state of Kerala. This state is also usually regarded as one of the 
best performers in terms of decentralization and local governance. Kerala has the highest female 
participation rate in the NREGA, at 85 percent and most recently, the state had the highest 
revision of the program’s wage with an increase of Rs. 17.218 This shows the positive outcomes 
that have occurred when locals are involved with the planning of works. In a country so 
expansive, it can be easy for oversights to be made. Perhaps breaking down the hierarchal and 
bureaucratic tendencies of the program can help to improve its functionality and targeting of 
disadvantaged groups.  
 The argument that has been made in this project states that when you take away the 
NREGA, negative impacts for women will occur. This reasoning does, however, have its 
obvious limitations. Because this phenomenon is occurring in real time, it is impossible to make 
any conclusive statements on how the program will affect women in the long run. However, by 
analyzing how the program has impacted women over the nearly ten years of its implementation 
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and looking towards the effects the scale back has most recently made, this project has attempted 
to answer this question in an educated manner. 
 Although faulty implementation has occurred and the government has only aided in 
exacerbating the program’s weaknesses, the core of the NREGA – providing people with the 
right to work – is worth saving. Women in India and other developing nations have faced severe 
barriers to the labor market, prompting them to fall into a spiral of poverty and unpaid work 
burdens. However, the guarantee that one can have a secure and stable job has shown time and 
time again that it helps to weaken the pull of this spiral. However, some have failed to see the 
potential of such programs. This is what this project has attempted to do, so that women who 
have lived and seen the benefits of the NREGA can continue to do so and the program can 
continue to grow and develop to meet the needs of India’s most disadvantaged. 
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Figure 1: Share of Female Participation in South Africa’s Expanded Public Works 
Program219 
 
Figure 2: High Percentage of Female Participants in Argentina’s Jefes Program220 
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Figure 3: Agricultural v. Non-Agricultural Wages; agricultural wages in India failed to 
keep up with those in the non-agricultural sector in the years prior to the NREGA221 
 
Figure 4: The Share of Female Participation in NREGA; share has risen consistently since 
2006222 
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Figure 5: Number of Participants in NREGA by Gender and Program Expenditure223 
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Figure 6: Share of Female Participants in NREGA by State224 
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Figure 7: Share of Female Participation in NREGA in 2008-2009 against LFPR Prior to 
Program; the share of women’s work in NREGA is greater than their LFPR prior to the 
program in majority of states225 
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Figure 8: Labor Force Participation Rates for Men and Women; female participation rates 
have declined since implementation of NREGA226 
 
Figure 9: Rise in Rural Wages and Decrease in Wage Gap227 
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Figure 10: Rather Equal Distribution of NREGA Works228 
 
Figure 11: Lack of Provisions at NREGA Worksites229 
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Figure 12: Decreases in NREGA Funding230 
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Figure 13: All Works Performed under NREGA from 2011-2012231 
 
Figure 14: All Works Performed in 2014-2015; shift to more infrastructure-based works 232 
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Figure 15: Inverse Relationship between Mean Male Household Wages and Female LFPR, 
Income Effect233 
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Table 1: Cost Effectiveness of EGPs 234 
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Table 2: Change in Private Sector Wages due to NREGA base wage235 
 1999-
2000 
2007-
2008 
2009-2010 2011-2012 
Average Rural 
Daily Wage of 
Women in casual 
work 
29.01 48.41 68.94 
% change = 
42% 
103.28 
% change = 
50% 
Average Rural 
Daily Wages for 
Men in casual 
work 
44.84 66.59 101.53 
% change = 
52% 
149.32 
% change = 
47% 
Average Daily 
Wages for 
Women in 
NREGA works 
-- 79 87.2 
% change = 
10% 
 
101.97 
% change = 
17% 
Average Daily 
Wages for Men in 
NREGA works 
-- 78.84 90.93 
% change = 
15% 
 
112.46 
% change = 
24% 
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Table 3: Share of Female Participants in NREGA by State236 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
236 Mahatma Gandhi NREGA OutComes Database. 
1. KERALA 84.97625 
2. TAMIL NADU 80.065 
3. RAJASTHAN 68.05 
4. PUDUCHERRY 57.6275 
5. ANDHRA PRADESH 57.5825 
6. TRIPURA 47.12625 
7. KARNATAKA 46.6025 
8. CHHATTISGARH 45.91875 
9. GUJARAT 45.41625 
10. GOA 45.11 
11. HIMACHAL PRADESH 44.79625 
12. MADHYA PRADESH 43.0725 
13. MAHARASHTRA 42.87125 
14. SIKKIM 41.43125 
15. UTTARAKHAND 40.73875 
16. MANIPUR 39.6925 
17. MEGHALAYA 38.69625 
18. ODISHA 36.675 
19. HARYANA 35.51375 
20. PUNJAB 35.17875 
21. ANDAMAN AND 
NICOBAR 
33.83 
22. JHARKHAND 32.33625 
23. NAGALAND 31.91 
24. DADRA & NAGAR 
HAVELI 
31.52625 
25. MIZORAM 31.19125 
26. ARUNACHAL PRADESH 29.63125 
27. WEST BENGAL 28.80125 
28. BIHAR 28.325 
29. ASSAM 27.44625 
30. LAKSHADWEEP 25.505 
31. UTTAR PRADESH 18.90625 
32. JAMMU AND KASHMIR 10.825 
33. DAMAN & DIU 0 
34. DemoStateCHANDIGARH 0 
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Table 4: Change in Female Labor Force Participation Rate by State; decreases across most 
states237 
State Rural Urban 
 2004-05 2011-12 2004-05 2011-12 
Andhra Pradesh 48.3 44.5 22.4 17 
Arunachal Pradesh 41 27.8 14.8 12.7 
Assam 20.9 12.2 10.9 9 
Bihar 13.8 5.3 6.5 4.5 
Chhattisgarh 45.4 41.5 18.1 24 
Delhi 4.7 14.6 8.8 10.4 
Goa 18.8 21 18.8 15.7 
Gujarat 42.7 27.8 15.1 13.3 
Haryana 31.7 16.2 13.2 9.7 
Himachal Pradesh 50.6 52.4 24.1 21.2 
Jammu & Kashmir 26.7 25.5 11.2 11.7 
Jharkhand 31.3 19.8 13.4 6.6 
Karnataka 45.9 28.7 18.1 16.3 
Kerala 25.6 22.1 20 19.1 
Madhya Pradesh 36.6 23.9 15.4 11.5 
Maharashtra 47.4 38.8 19 16.6 
Manipur 35.1 26.2 22.1 18.2 
Meghalaya 47.8 39.1 30.3 20.2 
Mizoram 44.1 39.4 28.1 24.9 
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Nagaland 50.4 31.2 25.7 14.4 
Orissa 32.2 24.6 14.8 15.5 
Punjab 32.2 23.4 13.3 13.6 
Rajasthan 40.7 34.7 18.2 14.1 
Sikkim 31.8 48.7 16.8 27.3 
Tamil  Nadu 46.1 37.8 24.1 20.1 
Tripura 8.5 22.8 10 11.3 
Uttaranchal 42.7 30.8 12.7 8.6 
Uttar Pradesh 24 17.7 11.7 10.2 
West Bengal 17.8 18.9 15.5 17.4 
All India 32.7 24.8 16.6 14.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
